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11. INTRODUCTION
What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked
what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.
-- Augustine; Confessions 11.14.17
The computational view of the mind rests on the assumption that psychological theories
and laws can eventually be implemented in a computer - in a Universal Turing Machine. It
is claimed that the mind consists of symbols with semantics and processes that manipulate
those symbols; thought is the manipulation of symbols. By combining, moving and
deleting symbols the mind can create new symbols with new meanings. (Pinker
1994/1997; Clark 1996.)
The symbol manipulation view of the mind arose in the fifties. It gave birth and
justification to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and seemed to solve certain philosophical
problems. Symbols have meaning, but since they are also something physical (ink on the
paper, sound waves, neurons...) they can have causal powers at the same time, which is a
possible explanation of how something mental, such as the mind, could have causal powers
over physical entities. The idea that thought is computation also provided much more
explanatory power than previous associative theories. So, if the mind was nothing but a
symbol manipulator, then there should be no reason why a computer, a symbol cruncher
par excellence, could not possess intelligence; hence the promise of AI.
The view that the mind is computational raises many questions. What kind of algorithms
does it use? And how many? How is knowledge encoded and what kind of inference
mechanisms are available? Humans, by all standards, possess a remarkable amount of
conceptual knowledge touching a broad range of topics from mundane facts to profound
theories: we have knowledge concerning our everyday life, how to get from one place to
another, latest trends in fashion, bus time tables, what to do in case of illness; personal
facts such as our names, kinship relations, phone numbers, education; we also know a vast
2amount of information concerning topics such as history, biology, politics, literature, etc.
How is this massive amount of conceptual knowledge represented? How is all the
information organized? How can humans use it so efficiently and with such ease?
Knowledge representation plays a vital role in AI, because how information is encoded
determines what kind of reasoning can be done with the knowledge base, how complex it
is and how much storage capacity is needed for the information. But what kind of a
knowledge representation system does a human cognizer use? In order to have
psychological plausibility a knowledge representation tool should use the same
representations as humans and enable the same inferences as humans are capable of
conducting, but at the same time it should also disable all the inferences that we cannot
make.
This study will examine current major theories of concepts put forward by cognitive
psychologist and philosophers and see how naturally they could be simulated using the
Object-Oriented (OO) knowledge representation. The goal of is to evaluate the
psychological credibility of the OO approach to representing concepts. The reason for
choosing the OO knowledge representation is that recently a new type of OO languages
has emerged. These object-based languages offer possibilities lacking in previous
languages. This study will show that these languages can overcome some problems
associated with traditional OO languages and also with frames. This study will also point
out two grave weaknesses in the entire OO paradigm.
How humans actually think and model the world is relevant to the design of programming
languages and has always played a role in the development of new languages (Partridge
1996, 61). All programming languages, like natural languages, can be seen as models of
the world. Languages in turn reflect our mental models of the world. Analogously a
programming language creates a certain model of the world. Ideally, these models should
converge. A language that would be more 'human-like' and conceptually intuitive would
presumably be easier to learn, use and understand than, say, a machine language; programs
created with this language would be similar to the concepts that we actually employ.
The following chapter will review the current major theories of concepts. The third chapter
is devoted to knowledge representation and especially to the OO one and the two
3paradigms in it. Some other tools are briefly considered also for the sake of comparison. In
the fourth chapter I will provide implementations for the reviewed theories of concepts
with both types of OO languages. The final chapter provides a short review and a summary
of the findings.
On the terminology and the notations. No distinction is made between categories and
concept, besides a brief note below. The terms "properties", "features" and "attributes" will
also be used interchangeably. Names of concepts are written in uppercase. When referring
to words double quotation marks are used. Thus, the word "dog" gets its meaning from the
concept/category DOG that can have e.g. the properties/features/attributes barking, four-
legged and animal; "dog" and DOG both refer to dogs. Italics is reserved for emphasis and
markup.
42. THEORIES OF CONCEPTS
2.1 What are concepts?
"Concepts seem to be the very stuff of which cognitions are made" (Rey 1983, 237). Why
are certain objects grouped together? What makes cats fall under the concept CAT and not
under the concept DOG? What is it that unites members of a certain category?
Categorization is one of the most basic cognitive skills in humans. It is so automatic and so
deeply rooted that we might not even notice it until explicitly confronted with it. Every
time we see, hear, feel or smell something as a kind of something we are categorizing and
using concepts. Recognizing words as verbs or substantives, or seeing chairs or trees or
clowns is categorizing; instead of seeing a particular or an individual we also see a
category; it is the category that glues the individuals together into one unit. In performing
any actions such as writing, tying shoes, trading stocks or giving a speech we use hundreds
of categories. All of these actions differ in some respect - they are never identical - yet they
are still actions of some kind and we know how to make actions of that kind.
Categorization becomes more difficult in, for example, scientific theories where we don't
always know to which category certain objects belong and when the boundary of two
categories is fuzzy. Is a whale a kind of a fish or a mammal? What is the difference
between an angry and a frustrated person?
A theory of concepts tries to explain what is it that unites and binds a group of individuals
or events together. Sometimes concepts can appear to be very simple at least on the
surface. Concepts such as CHAIR, DOG and CAT seem to be self-evident. Everybody
knows what they are. On the other end are concepts, such as TIME, DEMOCRACY and
LOVE, that everybody knows that they don't really know what they are. On top of this,
there are categories that can be very exotic and perplexing (at least for the western mind).
The ancient Chinese classification below divides the animal kingdom in thirteen
categories:
On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into (a) those that
belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d)
suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are
5included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j)
innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush, (l)
others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble
flies from a distance. (Lakoff 1987a, 92).
Australian aboriginal language Dyirbal has a category called "balan", which includes such
things as women, fire and dangerous things. It also includes birds that are not dangerous
and some exotic animals like platypus, bandicoot and echidna (Lakoff 1987a, 5). At first
look, it seems that things such as children, jewelry, portable TVs, paintings, manuscripts
and photograph albums have nothing in common. But if one thinks about THINGS TO
TAKE OUT OF ONE'S HOME DURING A FIRE, there is, after all, something that
connects the items (Murphy & Medin 1985, 303). All in all, it seems that categorization is
not always such a simple matter. So, a theory of concepts must explain what exactly is it
that language learners learn when they learn to use words such as "chair", "time" or
"balan".
Categorization is a form of abstraction. It refers to the psychological capability to store
sufficient amount of information - not every tiny little detail - from given objects or events
in order to recognize similar future objects or events. Concepts do this work; they allow us
to store useful and pertinent conceptual information that applies to a set of individuals and
use this knowledge in the future. Without categories and the conceptual knowledge
associated with them, we would have to learn all the information of all the objects we ever
confront separately, but storing all the information of all the objects encountered is
impossible for a finite thing such as a brain or a computer. Therefore, by grouping objects
together into categories and storing information into them dramatically reduces the amount
of storage space needed. Having learned that tigers are dangerous, we can do our best to
escape a new one, because we know using our concept that it is dangerous. Without the
concept we would have to learn for each and every tiger separately that it is dangerous.
An intelligent being cannot treat every object it sees as a unique entity unlike
anything else in the universe. It has to put objects in categories so that it may
apply its hard-won knowledge about similar objects, encountered in the past, to
the object at hand. (Pinker 1997, 12).
All natural languages reflect this cognitive ability. Languages are full of terms that refer to
categories. The words "dog", "chair", "spoon", etc. do not refer to a certain individual, as
6the words "Michael Jackson" and "Bill Clinton" do. Instead, they name categories that
consist of possibly an infinite number of individuals. Without categories our languages
would explode with words, because we would have to invent a different word for every
single entity in the world. Concepts are what gives meaning to words. Words name
concepts and refer to objects in the world via concepts (Fodor 1998, 9). Conceptual
thinking is not tied to language only, but found also in prelinguistic thinking. Animals and
children younger than twelve months have been shown to be able to perform categorization
and patients who have lost their linguistic capacities due to aphasia have not lost their
ability to think in concepts (Saariluoma 1990, 71).
Concepts are perhaps the most fundamental and central units of cognition. There are other
types of representations, such as images and music, but the Representational Theory of the
Mind (RTM) assumes that at least propositional mental states, such as beliefs, desires and
knowing, have semantic content that relates them to things in the world and that they can
be used in psychological explanations (Fodor 1998, 6-8). These mental states are
represented using concepts.
One of the most important properties of concepts is that they are semantically
evaluable. A thought may be true or false, depending on how things are with
that portion of the world which the thought is about. (Laurence & Margolis
1999, 13).
For example, the belief that CATS ARE ANIMALS is composed of the
concepts/representations CATS, ARE and ANIMALS and inherits its meaning from only
them; in other words, the semantic content of mental states derives only from the
constituents of that particular state.
RTM says that there is no believing-that-P episode without a corresponding
tokening-of-a-mental-representation episode, and it contemplates no locus of
original intentionality except the contents of mental representations. (Fodor
1998, 8).
Concepts are hence a type of mental representation with semantic properties. The mental
state CATS ARE ANIMALS may be true or false, whereas other types of mental
representations, such as images, do not convey this kind of semantic information. An
image of a man walking up the hill may equally well be an image of a man walking down
7the hill backwards. Images thus lack the sort of semantic values that concepts have (Fodor
1975, 180-181).
Concepts can be primitive or complex. Complex concepts contain other concepts as their
parts. The parts can again be complex concepts, but in order to avoid infinite regress at
some stage a concept can no longer have other concepts as its part. At this stage, the
concept is a primitive concept. If a concept is composed of other concepts it is complex,
otherwise primitive. Lexical concepts are concepts denoted by a single morpheme in a
language, whereas phrasal concepts are denoted by several morphemes. That is, lexical
concepts correspond to words and phrasal concepts to sentences. Lexical concepts can be
either primitive or complex. It does not follow from the fact that the concept CAT has been
lexicalized in most languages and is therefore a primitive part of the language, that the
concept itself is primitive. Which concepts get lexicalized in a language depends greatly on
what is important in the culture of a language community. It could be that the concept ALL
BLACK CATS LIVING IN SOUTH FRANCE is lexicalized in some language with the
term "flurg". In this case, "flurg" would be a primitive part of the language, a lexical
concept, but FLURG would not be primitive. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 4).
Concepts can have structure in two ways. The Containment Model claims that structured
concepts literally have other concepts as their parts. If concept C has the concepts X and Y
as its parts, then you cannot think of the concept C without invoking X and Y. The model
has similarities to the way languages work. If you want to utter the sentence "Red is a
color", then you must also utter the words "red", "is", "a" and "color" - there is no way
around it. The Inferential Model says that concept's structure is the inferences that can be
drawn from it. A concept can therefore be instantiated without instantiating the concepts
that are part of its structure. Accordingly, one can entertain the concept RED without
instantiating the concept COLOR; color can be inferred from RED, but it does not have to
be instantiated when RED is. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 5.)
2.2 What theories of concepts must explain?
Since concepts play such a vital role in cognition, a theory of concepts should explain quite
a lot of psychological phenomena starting from categorization, reference determination and
8concept learning. Here are Fodor's (1998, 23-34) five "non-negotiable" conditions that any
theory of concepts must explain.
1. Concepts are mental particulars. (Fodor 1998, 23).
There is a philosophical debate concerning the ontological status of concepts. Are they
located in the head or are they some external entities located in some mysterious platonic
realm? From the point of view of this paper the ontology of concepts is quite irrelevant and
will not be examined any further, except for remarking that the commitment to RTM
assumes that concepts are mental particulars. This is also the standard view in psychology
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, 8).
Very roughly, concepts are constituents of mental states. Thus, for example,
believing that cats are animals is a paradigmatic mental state, and the concept
ANIMAL is a constituent of the belief that cats are animals [...]. So the natural
home of a theory of concepts is as part of a theory of mental states. (Fodor
1998, 6).
2. Concepts are categories and are routinely employed as such. (Fodor 1998,
24).
Strictly speaking, a category and a concept are not exactly the same. A category is what
bundles a group of objects together. A concept can, additionally, include all kinds of
conceptual information about the category. A child can learn to categorize different pieces
of metal objects as coins, but on top of this an adult has the concept MONEY with all
kinds of conceptual knowledge built into it: money has value that depends on economics, it
is illegal to counterfeit it, money is used as a tool of exchange and money would still be
money even if the coins change their appearance. Concepts are, nevertheless, used as
categories - they pick out entities in the world. The concept CAT picks out a group of
entities in the world, namely cats. "To say that concepts are categories is to say that they
apply to things in the world; things in the world 'fall under them'" (Fodor 1998, 24). As
said before, concepts and categories are treated equally in this study.
3. Compositionality: concepts are the constituents of thoughts and, in
indefinitely many cases, of one another. Mental representations inherit their
contents from the contents of their constituents. (Fodor 1998, 25).
9Productivity of thought means that there is no bound or upper limit to the number of
distinct thoughts that we can potentially entertain. The same applies to languages: there is
no theoretical limit to how long a sentence in a language can be. The following sentence
can be extended forever:
John woke up.
John woke up this morning.
John woke up this morning and ate breakfast.
John woke up this morning and ate breakfast and brushed his teeth.
Etc.
All of the sentences above express different thoughts and since there are infinitely many of
them, it follows that thought must be productive as well. Productivity is an idealization. It
does not mean that we produce an infinite number of sentences practically. It only means
that the mechanism responsible for generating sentences is only limited by performance
limitation, such as memory and time.
This is not, of course, to argue that the practical possibilities are literally
infinite. Just as there is a longest-sentence-that-anyone-can-utter, so there must
be a most-complex-situation-that-anyone-can-act-upon. The infinite capacity of
the representational system is thus an idealization, but it is not an arbitrary
idealization. (Fodor 1975, 31).
Thought is also said to be systematic. Once we can entertain a certain type of thought we
can entertain an infinite set of similar thoughts. If we can think JOHN LOVES MARY,
then we can also think MARY LOVES JOHN, ROMEO LOVES JULIA, JULIA LOVES
ROMEO, etc. The systematicity of thought is not an a priori fact. It could well be that we
would have to learn each of the above thoughts separately, but it just isn't so. When a child
learns a certain expression, the child learns an infinite set of similar expressions at the
same time. (Fodor 1998, 26.)
We can explain the productivity and systematicity of thought if we assume that thought is
also compositional. Compositionality means that thoughts can be combined from smaller
components by using a set of rules. If the rules allow the components to be used again and
again, then the combining mechanism produces an infinite amount of different thoughts
from the basic repertoire of components. Compositionality, therefore, explains the
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systematicity and productivity of thought by postulating only a finite amount of objects in
the mind (the primitive components and the rules).
As an example of compositionality we can imagine that the mind contains the following
context-free grammar G = (V, Z, P, S):
V = { S, A, B, C, V, John, Mary, Romeo, Julia, loves, hates, likes, knows, who }
Z = { John, Mary, Romeo, Julia, loves, hates, likes, knows, who }
P = { S -> A V B,
A -> John | Mary | Romeo | Julia,
V -> loves | hates | likes | knows,
B -> A | A C V B,
C -> who }
S = { S }
This context-free grammar generates productively and systematically expressions using
compositionality (all the expressions are composed from a finite base of symbols and
recursive rules). The following sentences work as demonstrations:
John loves Mary
Mary loves Romeo
Romeo loves Romeo
Romeo hates Julia who likes Mary
Julia knows John who knows Mary who hates Romeo who likes Mary
4. Quite a lot of concepts must turn out to be learned. (Fodor 1998, 27).
A theory of concepts must also explain how concepts are learned. Some concepts, e.g.
primitives, may be innate, but most concepts must be learned; it is quite implausible that
concepts like GRUNGE-ROCK, DONUT and INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION are innate.
What this means is that the ability to learn must be enabled in a knowledge representation
system - if all concepts were just preprogrammed into it, it would not be a serious
candidate as a psychological model.
5. Concepts are public; they're the sorts of things that lots of people can, and
do, share. (Fodor 1998, 28).
This is Fodor's argument against conceptual relativism, which shortly means that different
people don't share the same concepts at all and even one individual might not have the
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same concepts between different time slices. Concepts are type identical across people
living in different times, cultures and with different backgrounds. That is, people share the
same concepts. In order to communicate thoughts about dogs or to agree or disagree about
dogs, we must have the concept DOG in common. Otherwise, communication breaks down
and we would not have a real agreement or disagreement about anything - it would just be
a verbal dispute. Different people surely have different knowledge about dogs and different
experiences with them, but this is just to say that their concept of dog is related or
associated to different concepts.
The following review of the current major theories of concepts follows closely the reviews
done by Laurence & Margolis (1999) and Fodor (1998). I have added a separate chapter
for the dual theories, because this is what some of the models will end up being. The two
reviews exclude holistic theories of concepts and connectionist ones (see for example
Clark (1993)). This paper will omit them likewise.
2.3 The classical theory
All theories of concepts can be seen as reactions to the classical, definitional view of
concepts. The theory stems from the ontologies of Plato and Aristotle and has been among
us for more than 2000 years: it is the standard view in science, but also in folk psychology
and has not been questioned until this century. (Fodor & al. 1980, 263; Lakoff 1987a, xii;
Laurence & Margolis 1999, 8.)
According to the classical view, categories are defined solely by the common properties
shared by all members of the category. There is a set of necessary and sufficient properties
to distinguish if an object belongs to a certain category. It either does or does not; there are
no graded boundaries. It is a matter of two-valued logic: a statement of type "object x
belongs to the category X" is either true or false. Classical concepts are then structured -
their structure is the definition.
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Katz gives an example of a definition. The concept CHAIR according to him has the
following definition (1972, 40):
(Object), (Physical), (Non-living), (Artifact), (Furniture), (Portable),
(Something with legs), (Something with a back), (Something with a seat), (Seat
for one)
CHAIR is thus composed of these concepts or features and if an object is structured of
these and only these concepts it is a chair. Otherwise it is not. The components in the
definition can themselves have a definition. The concept OBJECT used in the definition
might be defined as "an organization of parts that are spatio-temporally contiguous which
form a stable whole having an orientation in space" (Katz 1972, 40). But eventually one
must reach primitive concepts that lack definitions. The primitives can either be viewed
from the empiricist point of view as 'unproblematic' sensory percepts or from the rationalist
point of view as innate concepts (Fodor & al. 1980, 266; Fodor 1981, 263; Laurence &
Margolis 1999, 9).
2.3.1 The power of definitions
Not only is the classical theory simple, it provides good answers for several questions.
First, because a concept is defined of necessary and sufficient features, the task of learning
a concept can be seen as finding those features. Since a concept can be complex, it is
required that the constituent concepts are learned first, but at the bottom of the stack there
are concepts that the learner has innately or that are given as inputs from senses. If the
primitive concepts are sensory features, then the learner can notice that in the environment
a certain set of features are found together. These could be the features that encode the
concept CAT and an another bundle of features might encode all the dogs found in the
environment. What is required is a finite base of already known concepts; after that, new
concepts, an infinite amount of them in fact, can be learned by assembling the already
known ones into novel syntactical combinations. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 10.)
Second, the explanation of categorization by the classical model is quite simple. Once a
category is learned, it can be used to check if a new object falls under it by checking that it
has all the features that are part of the category. If the object has these features, then it falls
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under the category, otherwise it is outside the category. So, to verify if an encountered
object is a bird, that is, if it is part of the extension of the concept BIRD, one must check
that it has feathers, is an animal, can fly, has wings and whatever else is part of the
definition. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 11.)
Third, concepts also seem to have inferential properties. From the statement "there is a
chair in the room", one can infer that there is a piece of furniture in the room, that there is
something physical in the room, that there is something non-living in the room, etc. (Katz
1972, 41). But one cannot infer that there is something expensive in the room, that there is
a carnivore in the room or that there is something drinkable in the room. The valid
inferences seem to be obviously valid - they follow analytically from the meaning of
CHAIR, whereas the invalid ones do not; it could be that there is something expensive in
the room, but it is not an analytic truth - some chairs are cheap, some expensive. These
inferences can be explained by appealing to the definition: if the concepts FURNITURE,
PHYSICAL, NON-LIVING are part of CHAIR, then one can infer with certitude that if an
object is a chair, then it is necessarily a piece of furniture as well. (Laurence & Margolis
1999, 12.)
Fourth, knowing a concept includes knowing which objects in the world it applies to. What
comes to reference determination, the classical model once again explains this by
appealing to the definition: a concept refers to all those objects that satisfy its definition.
For complex concepts the reference is determined compositionally. It is the intersection of
the extensions of the defining concepts. BACHELOR refers to all things that are unmarried
and males. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 13.)
2.3.2 Criticism of the classical theory
The classical view has been taken for granted until the 20th century when both philosophers
and psychologist attacked it. As was seen above, the classical view explains in a quite
simple and similar manner many questions.
The classical mentalist view is that postulating concepts answers three
questions; (a) what does a term in a natural language express; (b) what
determines the extension of a term in a natural language; and (c) what does a
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term in a natural language contribute to the semantics of the complex
expressions in which it occurs. The beauty of the classical story is that it
provides the same answer for all three of these questions: in particular, the very
thing which determines the extension of a term is also what the term
contributes to the (syntactically) complex expressions that contain it. (Fodor
1981, 295).
Regardless of the explanatory power of the theory its popularity has been diminishing. The
gravest problem of the theory is simply the lack of definitions. Definitions are hard to
come by. It is extremely difficult to define even simple things like apples or chairs. But in
science also many basic concepts in any discipline are in the end left undefined. On top of
this, definitions were supposed to decompose closer to the primitive level. But it can be
doubted if any of the proposed definitions have managed to do this. Are the concepts
UNMARRIED and MAN any closer to sensory data than the concept BACHELOR, which
they were suppose to define? Recall Katz's monstrous definition for "object": "an
organization of parts that are spatio-temporally contiguous which form a stable whole
having an orientation in space". Or how about the definition for "ketch": "two masted
sailing vessel such that the art (or 'mizzen') mast is stepped forward of the helm" (Fodor &
al. 1980, 268). Have these definitions actually gotten us anywhere at all? The job that
definitions were suppose to do was to get us eventually to the primitive level of sensory
concepts, but at least these examples have not succeeded in it. Moreover, one can
justifiably ask why try to explain a word with other words? Does it ever lead us closer to
the meaning of words? (Fodor & al. 1980, 268; Laurence & Margolis 1999, 14.)
The problem that definitions are hard to come by doesn't mean that definitions haven't been
proposed at all. On the contrary, any science is full of attempts to formulate good
definitions that meet all conditions: bachelor = an unmarried man, mother = a woman who
has given birth to a child and e.g. the above definition for chair. The problem is that one
can always find counter examples to definitions. The classical theory stipulates that
definitions are necessary and sufficient - all or nothing. It does not tolerate exceptions or
unclear cases. But there are popes, homosexual males, Tarzans and Robinson Cruseos that
are unmarried men, but who are not clearly bachelors. There are stepmothers, surrogate
mothers, adoptive mothers, foster mothers, biological mothers and donor mothers. And
there are rocking chairs, barber chairs, wheelchairs, beanbag chairs and electric chairs that
don't really match the definition, but they are nonetheless chairs for all that1. No matter
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how hard one tries it seems that definitions fail to capture the set of objects that fall under
the concept. Either definitions are too loose or too strict.
It should be added that perhaps there might be few definitions out there somewhere. In the
field of mathematics, for example, one might find some rock-solid definitions (even
number = an integer divisible by two). Perhaps somewhere else too. But this is not a
counter argument to the criticism: we have thousands, if not millions, of lexical concepts
and if the classical model is to work it must find definitions for all them.
- There are practically no defensible examples of definitions; for all the
examples we've got, practically all words (/concepts) are undefinable. And, of
course, if a word (/concept) doesn't have a definition, then its definition can't be
its meaning. (Oh well, maybe there's one definition. Maybe BACHELOR has
the content unmarried man. Maybe there are even six or seven definitions; why
should I quibble? If there are six or seven definitions, or sixty or seventy, that
still leaves a lot of words/concepts undefined, hence a lot of words/concepts of
which the definitional theory of meaning is false. The OED lists half a million
words, plus or minus a few.) (Fodor 1998, 45).
It can be remarked that maybe definitions haven't been found yet because they are just so
hard to find. Perhaps, but, for example, philosophy can be said to be all about finding
definitions. Philosophers ask questions of type What is knowledge, What is good, What is
freedom, etc. The answers that philosophers have proposed are definitions: Knowledge is a
true justified belief, Good is the maximization of pleasure, Freedom is the absence of
coercion... It is an embarrassing fact that even after 2500 years of the efforts from the
greatest minds in the world, philosophy has accomplished practically nothing. Couldn't this
be interpreted so that perhaps there was something wrong with the enterprise in the first
place? Maybe the assumption that there are answers to questions of type What is X is
invalid. Just maybe definitions haven't been found, because there aren't any definitions to
be found at all.
Putnam (1970) has put forward arguments that are even more devastating for the classical
view. If he is correct, then it is useless to even have hope of finding definitions, because
they cannot account for meaning of words even in theory. Putnam attacks what is called
descriptivist views of semantics, which roughly means that word reference is determined
via a description (a definition for example). Contrasting theories claim that descriptions are
unnecessary to account for word meaning; meaning simply is reference. Classical view is a
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descriptivist view, because a definition is needed to explain concept's reference. (Laurence
& Margolis 1999, 21.)
The problem with any descriptivist view is that we can be deeply mistaken about our
definitions and theories for concepts. Many concepts can undergo radical conceptual
changes as has happened for an example to the concept DISEASE. The concept disease
dates back to ancient Greek and Hippocrates, who held a humoral theory of the causes of
diseases: diseases are caused by the imbalance of fluids in the body. This was already a
radical conceptual change, because before Hippocrates and his disciples diseases were
believed to be divine punishments inflected on people by gods. The first change to the
humoral theory was made only in the 16th century in Italy by Fracastro. He suggested for
the first time an idea that there are some small strange particles that transmit themselves
from body to body causing a contagion that finally leads to a disease. In the 19th century,
Louis Pasteur and others dropped the humoral theory for good and developed the modern
germ theory of diseases. The transition from the humoral theory to the germ theory
involved many radical conceptual changes. (Thagard 1999.)
The germ theory still prevails and from our point of view the earlier theorists were sadly
mistaken about diseases. But to emphasize, they were mistaken about diseases; our
theories are theories about diseases as are theirs. If all these people talk about the same
thing, then it follows that their definitions cannot be essential of DISEASE; the concept is
the same regardless of the definition surrounding it. If the definition was constitutive of the
concept DISEASE, then we would not be disagreeing about diseases, instead, all examples
above would be talking about some altogether different concepts. (Laurence & Margolis
1999, 21.)
All concepts can undergo same kinds of radical changes. Say, that some of the defining
properties of lemons are yellow and sour, that cats are all four legged animals and that
tigers are striped. Nothing guarantees that these properties are necessary. Maybe lemons
actually are blue; it just happens that we have been in contact with some very unusual
lemons that for some bizarre reason are yellow. Maybe cats turn out to be robots controlled
by Martians. Maybe tigers have been painted with stripes only to deceive us. Since it
seems that no definition is immune to revision it follows that they just cannot be the core
of concepts. (Putnam 1970, 180.)
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It seems that our definitions can be badly mistaken. But we can also be ignorant of them. If
we imagine just for the sake of argument that there are perfect definitions and the modern
definition of DISEASE is one them, then we find the classical theory in a situation where it
is cognitively quite too demanding. Do people really, really know the definition of
DISEASE? Most people are ignorant of the germ theory or have only a superficial
understanding of it - one that they were forced to learn in school and have, most likely,
happily forgotten long ago. If the definition of DISEASE is the current germ theory, we are
forced to conclude that this is what people learn when they learn to use the word "disease".
But isn't this a bit too much to ask? Even children understand something about diseases.
Now, do we expect them to have mastered a modern scientific theory - a theory introduced
only in high school and university courses? If the classical theory still wants to claim that
there are definitions - although practically none have been found - it also has to explain
why so many people are blissfully ignorant of them, but still know perfectly well how to
use concepts. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 22.)
Later Wittgenstein (1953, 1:65-78) also pointed out that there are many categories that do
not fit the classical demand that all members of a category share the same properties. The
category GAME does not possess common properties shared by all games. Some games
are just for fun - there is no competition. Other games involve luck, like games played with
dice, but in some games skill is everything, like in chess. Still others, like poker, involve
both luck and skill. Skill is needed in tennis too, but it is very different kind of skill than in
othello. Some games consist of thousands of competitors like big marathons in Olympic
Games. In some games, there are only few players - yet patience and console games
involve only one player. Category boundaries are also extendable: games come and go.
New games are invented all the time and some games vanish for good. Think of role
playing games for example or computer games played over the Internet, where the players
may also participate in the game design.
Wittgenstein claimed that the different games are united by what he called "family
resemblances". Games resemble each other, but there is no one single property manifest in
all games. As we move from one game to an other similarities and relationships crop up
and disappear. Games form a complex network of criss-crossing properties and are tied to
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other games in a wide variety of ways, and this is what makes them a category - not one
property or a set of properties shared by all games.
More formally, category C can consist of the following members: AB, BC, CD, AC and
BD. Members are united in this case by family resemblance; no single property can be
predicated to all members, instead, the members are connected to each other in many ways.
Still they resemble each other enough to belong to the same category.
2.4 The prototype theory
Many people have an intuition that some members are better examples of a category than
others, e.g. office chair is a more typical chair than a beanbag chair and similarly robin is
birdier than flamingo. It is also common knowledge that there are no rules without
exceptions. The classical theory cannot explain this, because if concepts encode necessary
and sufficient features, then all members of the category share them and are therefore on
equal footing; there is no reason why one member should more clearly fall under a concept
than another. In a sense, it seems even a bit odd to ask in the classical framework how well
an instance belongs to a category, because they are either in or out. The intuition that
categories are graded and always contain exceptions is, in fact, backed up by a vast amount
of psychological evidence. The prototype theory sets out to explain these and other
empirical findings.
Rosch and her colleagues invented a battery of experiments to empirically test the
assumptions of the classical theory (Rosch 1973a/1973b/1975/1978; Rosch & Mervis
1975; Rosch & al. 1976). First, some natural categories such as color and geometrical
forms cannot be arbitrarily classified into any units as might be expected by the classical
theory. Instead, some colors, called "focal colors", and geometrical forms, such as square,
circle and triangle, are much easier to learn and memorize. This is not even dependent on
language or culture. Speakers of Dani, a Stone Age culture in Indonesia with only two
color words and no words at all for geometrical figures, learned focal colors and
geometrical shapes easier than others, just as English speakers did. In fact, what colors are
first lexicalized in languages is very systematic and universal: The first colors to enter a
lexicon are black and white. They are followed by red, which is followed by either yellow,
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blue or green (Lakoff 1987a, 25). Thus, contrary to what the classical theory would predict,
the color space and geometrical planes cannot be divided in any way; some colors and
geometrical forms are better than others. These members are called "natural prototypes"
and categories form around them. In the case of color, there is even neurological evidence
to support the cognitive primacy of prototypical colors. (Rosch 1973a.)
Members in a category are also in an asymmetrical relation to each other. The prototypes
are cognitive reference points to which other members are compared. So, people tend to
think that 97 is almost 100, but not that 100 is almost 97. Similarly, a line in an angle of 45
degrees is almost a horizontal line, but not vice versa. (Rosch 1975.)
When participants are asked to rank how good an item is of a category, they generally have
no difficulty doing this and the results of these typicality effects (also called prototype
effects) are systematic between individuals and quite consistent between different
experiments. As an example, in one study participants were asked to judge how well items
belong to a category, e.g. is a robin a better bird than a chicken. The following table shows
results of rating the goodness of members in different categories in the scale 1-7, where 1.0
is the most typical (based on Rosch 1973b, 133):
Fruit Vegetable Bird
Apple 1.3 Carrot 1.1 Robin 1.1
Plum 2.3 Asparagus 1.3 Eagle 1.2
Pineapple 2.3 Celery 1.7 Wren 1.4
Strawberry 2.3 Onion 2.7 Ostrich 3.3
Fig 4.7 Parsley 3.8 Chicken 3.8
Olive 6.2 Pickle 4.4 Bat 5.8
Vehicle Disease Crime
Car 1.0 Cancer 1.2 Murder 1.0
Scooter 2.5 Malaria 1.4 Stealing 1.3
Boat 2.7 Muscular dystrophy 1.9 Assault 1.4
Tricycle 3.5 Measles 2.8 Blackmail 1.7
Skis 5.7 Rheumatism 3.5 Embezzling 1.8
Horse 5.9 Cold 4.7 Vagrancy 5.3
In another experiment participants were asked to list properties found in members of a
category. The results suggest that properties are not shared by all members. Instead, some
properties are statistically much more frequent in a category; some properties were listed
only for few items in the category; only rarely was there a property shared by all members.
The number of times each attribute is listed for items in a particular category corresponds
to its importance or weight in a category, that is, if a property is found in ten members of a
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category, then its weight is 10. Member's "family resemblance degree" or "cue validity" is
the sum of all the weighted attributes listed for it. So, if three properties are listed for a
member, each of them having a weight of 1, then the members family resemblance degree
is 3 (1+1+1). (Rosch & Mervis 1975.)
The interesting thing to note was that the members with the highest family resemblance
degree corresponded to the prototypes of that category. This can be seen in the table below
(Rosch & Mervis 1975, 582):
Number of attributes in common to five most and five least prototypical
members of six categories.
Category Most typical members Least typical members
Furniture
Vehicle
Fruit
Weapon
Vegetable
Clothing
13
36
16
9
3
21
2
2
0
0
0
0
Prototypes, then, correspond to members "[…] with most properties in common with other
members of the category and least attributes in common with other categories" (Rosch &
Mervis 1975, 573). The study shows that attributes in a category have different weights.
Some are judged to be more frequent and some less frequent. And if categories have family
resemblance structure, then the formation of a prototype is a natural consequence. In
Rosch's words, "[t]he present study is an empirical confirmation of Wittgenstein's (1953)
argument that formal criteria are neither a logical nor psychological necessity; […]"
(Rosch & Mervis 1975, 603).
Concepts form hierarchical taxonomies - they are not an unorganized mess. As we learn,
we find that some categories have more specific subcategories and some are united by a
higher, more abstract category. The concepts DOG, CAT and HORSE are connected to the
higher level concept ANIMAL. Similarly DOG is above the concepts GOLDEN-
RETRIEVER and BULLDOG. According to the classical view, no level should have a
special status. Rosch & al. (1976) showed that this is not the case; psychologically the
most important level is in the middle of the hierarchy. This level, called the "basic level", is
the first level learned and it can be later specialized to a subordinate level or generalized to
a superordinate level (Lakoff 1987a, 46):
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SUPERORDINATE: ANIMAL FURNITURE
BASIC LEVEL: DOG CHAIR
SUBORDINATE: RETRIEVER ROCKING CHAIR
When participants are asked to list attributes of a category, they usually list attributes
found in the basic level, and very few attributes of the superordinate level. The basic level
is hence the most inclusive level. It is the also the level at which children learn to use
words first; at the age of three almost every word belongs to the basic level. Basic level
objects have "interactional properties", meaning that people have ways to interact with
them and to form mental images, whereas at the superordinate level objects cannot be
interacted with and representing them needs a process of abstraction. This representation
can no longer be an image. For example, we can form an image representation of a chair or
a dog, but it is impossible to form an image of a furniture or an animal that would not be an
object of the basic level. (Rosch & al. 1976.)
The basic level is (Lakoff 1987a, 46):
- The highest level at which category members have similarly perceived overall
shapes.
- The highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire
category.
- The highest level at which a person uses similar motor actions for interacting
with category members.
- The level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members.
- The level with the most commonly used labels for category members.
- The first level named and understood by children.
- The first level to enter the lexicon of a language.
- The level with the shortest primary lexems.
- The level at which terms are used in neutral contexts. For example, There's a
dog on the porch can be used in a neutral context, whereas special contexts are
needed for There's mammal on the porch or There's a wire-haired terrier on
the porch. (See Cruse 1977.)
- The level at which most of our knowledge is organized.
The prototype theory explains this ensemble of findings - prototypes, cognitive reference
points, typicality effects, family resemblance and basic level - by postulating that concepts
are structured representations that consist of an open set of features. The features have
different statistical frequencies within a category. Prototypes are learned simply by
observing that a cluster of properties tends to correlate positively. Some features can be
more frequent than others; some can even be missing, but as long as there is enough
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similarity with the prototypical features the instance falls under a category. Instances don't,
then, need to have all the features found in the category. There still remains
features/properties as in the classical theory, but they are no longer considered to be
necessary. Instead, the features have a strong statistical tendency to occur together.
It should be pointed out at this moment that the mere fact that categories are graded is not a
decisive argument against the classical theory. Classical concepts can be fuzzy if any of the
constituent concepts are fuzzy. If the concept C has the definition C = AB and the
extension of A and/or B is graded, then C is graded also. But clearly C has a definition,
namely AB (Fodor 1975, 62). What does undermine the classical view is that it has no
natural way of explaining why typicality effects should rise at all. And why some levels
and members are cognitively much more significant.
How then are typicality effects explained? Because the judgement, if an instance belongs
to a category, is based on its similarity to the prototypical instances of the category,
categorization is performed using some sort of a similarity metric. When the metric
exceeds a threshold, the instance is positive, otherwise negative. So, if an instance clearly
has many of the required salient features, then the threshold is reached rapidly, because
only few features need to be checked. But when the instance barely has the features
required, a high number, if not all of them need to be calculated before the threshold is
reached. Calculating features is a time consuming process: the more features to check, the
longer it takes. Hence, the closer the instance is to the prototype, the faster it is recognized.
Exactly as participants in Rosch's experiment did. In the classical theory each instance
should be recognized in the same time, because every feature must be found on the
instance before it can be classified.
In sum, prototype categories differ from classical ones in several ways (adapted from
Pinker & Prince 1999, 8):
- They lack necessary and sufficient conditions for membership.
- They have graded degrees of membership.
- The category can be summarized by an ideal member or prototype,
sometimes but not always an actual exemplar of the category.
- There can be unclear cases - objects that may or may not be members of the
category at all.
- They often display a family resemblance structure.
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- Good members tend to have characteristic nondefining features.
2.4.1 Similarity metrics
An example of a similarity metric is Tversky's contrast rule used by Smith & al. (1988,
491). The similarity of an instance is calculated by checking how much it has in common
with the prototype, how many features are distinct to the prototype and how many features
are distinct to the instance. In terms of set theory this is equivalent of subtracting from the
intersection of P and I, the difference of P and I and the difference of I and P, where P is
the prototype and I is an instance. Formally it looks like this:
Sim(P,I) = af(P & I) - bf(P - I) - cf(I - P)
where a, b and c are factors that weight the importance of each set.
This metric yields the highest number for an instance that is equal to the prototype (the
prototype compared to itself). The result gets lower the more the instance differs from the
prototype, that is, the more distinct features it possesses. The metric does not, however, say
anything about the judgment if an instance falls under a category. For this an additional
threshold is required. If we set this to zero for simplicity, then we have a computational
model of categorization. If the value of the metric is above zero the object belongs to the
category, otherwise it doesn't.
Other types of similarity metrics exist also. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) have an
inherent prototype extraction mechanism (Clark 1993, 20). In ANNs individual neurons
are interpreted to be concepts2. If the neuron is activated by the input vectors from its
presynaptic neurons, then the concept is instantiated. There are many types of activation
functions, but a quite common one is the sigmoid function (Beale & Jackson 1990, 72)
defined as
F(net) = 1/(1 + ek*net)
where k is a positive gain term. It has the range 0 < f(net) < 1. The sigmoid function can be
used as a typicality metric: the closer the output is to 1, the more typical the input is. A
24
threshold needs to be added to this function as well to determine if an input belongs to the
category. If the threshold is set to 0.5, then a trained network will classify inputs into two
classes according to the following algorithm:
if F(net) > 0.5
output 1
else
output 0
The output neuron can represent, for example, the concept BURGLAR. The network is
given an input and if the burglar neuron outputs 1, the input belongs to the category
BURGLAR. The goodness of the input can be measured from the activation function. An
input that outputs 0.9 is a better burglar than an input with an output of only 0.6.
2.4.2 Criticism of the prototype theory
Prototype effects seem to be ubiquitous in concepts; there probably is no doubt about this,
but what can actually be inferred from them? Armstrong & al. (1983) tested if prototype
effects could be found in concepts that according to them are classical. The reasoning was
that if prototype effects appeared also in concepts that have definitions, concepts that are
all-or-none, then the conclusion that concepts are prototypes is invalid. And what they
found was exactly that: some concepts do have definitions and also prototype effects. If
this is the case, then the conclusion from prototype effects to prototype structure is
unwarranted. The tests replicated those performed by Rosch and others, except that the
concepts for which typicality effects were to be found were knife-edged, classical
concepts: EVEN NUMBER, ODD NUMBER, FEMALE and PLANE GEOMETRY
FIGURE. A concept such as ODD NUMBER has, according to Armstrong & al. (1983,
274) a definition: odd numbers are integers not divisible by two without remainder,
whereas even numbers are divisible. For FEMALE and PLANE GEOMETRY Armstrong
& al. don't give us a definition, but according to them they are well defined.
The results showed that even these concepts have typicality effects. People think the
number 13 is odder than 23. FEMALE also showed prototype effects, housewife and
ballerinas being better females than chairwomen or cowgirls. Participants also viewed
squares and triangles as being more typical geometrical figures than ellipses. On top of
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this, at the end of the study the participants were directly asked straight in the face if in
their opinion these concepts are graded. That is, are the categories all-or-none or is it
possible that some members belong to it more clearly than others? 100% of the participants
felt that it doesn't make sense to rate the items degree of membership in the categories
EVEN NUMBER, ODD NUMBER and PLANE GEOMETRY FIGURE (Armstrong & al.
1983, 287). Items are either in or out. For the category FEMALE the percentage was 86%.
This result is surprising, because when asked to rank how well members belong to a
category participants produced a clear and a systematic ranking of members, although they
claimed that it doesn't make sense to say that some integers are odder or evener than
others.
Armstrong & al. concluded from their study that the inference for prototype structure is
invalid. Graded responses seem to be irrelevant for the structure of concepts, because both
classical and prototype categories have them. The fact that there are prototype effects says
nothing in the end about the structure of concepts - they are only effects and nothing else.
These results do not suggest that categories such as fruit or vehicle are well-
defined in the classical or any other sense - no more than they suggest that odd
number is fuzzy. What they do suggest is that we are back at square one in
discovering the structure of everyday categories experimentally. This is
because our results indicate that certain techniques widely used to elicit and
therefore elucidate the structure of such categories are flawed. This being so,
the study of conceptual structure has not been put on an experimental footing,
and the structure of those concepts studied by current techniques remains
unknown. (Armstrong & al. 1983, 291).
Similar results were found in the English past tense system. Regular past tense verbs have
a definition, which simply is the rule stem+/ed/, but the class of irregular verbs shows
family resemblance structures and the verbs are organized around prototypical examples.
These results seem to indicate that categories can be both classical and prototypical.
(Pinker & Prince 1999, 47.)
Another common complaint against the prototype theory is that it is incapable of
explaining the productivity of thought. By combining concepts into larger concepts,
potentially an infinite number of complex concepts can be produced - this is the principle
of compositionality as was explained earlier. It makes no sense to explain that a finite
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organism, such as a brain or a computer, possesses an infinite amount of prototypes; there
can't be a prototype for every thought that we can think of.
There may, for example, be prototypical cities (London, Athens, Rome, New
York); there may even be prototypical American Cities (New York, Chicago,
Los Angeles); but there are surely no prototypical American cities situated on
the East Coast just a little south of Tennessee. Similarly, there may be
prototypical grandmothers, (Mary Worth) and there may be prototypical
properties of grandmothers (good, old Mary Worth). But there are surely no
prototypical properties of, say, Chaucer's grandmothers, and there are no
prototypical properties of grandmothers most of whose grandchildren are
married to dentists. (Fodor 1981, 296).
Consider also the following concepts (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 36):
U.S. MONARCH
31ST CENTURY INVENTION
GREAT-GREAT-GREAT GRANDCHILD OF CINDY CRAWFORD
PIECE OF PAPER I LEFT ON MY DESK LAST NIGHT
JUSTICE
These are perfectly fine concepts, but they lack a prototype. Some are too vague, some
refer to nonexistent things: there is no U.S. monarch and the great-great-great
grandchildren of Cindy Crawford aren't even born yet. How could anyone have a
prototype, a best example, of them?
One might think that the examples are just cleverly thought exceptions. But they all reflect
a deep and a pressing problem for the prototype theory: prototypes are not semantically
compositional. Consider the concepts STRIPED APPLE and APPLE. A good instance (a)
of a STRIPED APPLE is evidently not a very good example of an APPLE, since apples
rarely have stripes. Now, because (a) is always less typical of APPLE than STRIPED
APPLE, the following holds: C(STRIPED APPLE, (a)) > C(APPLE, (a)), where C is the
typicality value of (a), which could be 0.9 and 0.2 respectively. The fuzzy set theory is
usually used to model the set operations with prototypes. According to it, the intersection
of two sets is defined as the minimum of the values of the sets. If this is the case, then (a)
can never be higher than the minimum of STRIPED and APPLE. But this is not true,
because (a) is more prototypical of STRIPED APPLE than APPLE. The min rule simply
predicts this incorrectly: the typicality value of (a) would be 0.2, although it should be 0.9
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in this case. Therefore, one cannot arrive at a prototypical instance of STRIPED APPLE
from composing the concept STRIPED and APPLE - it will never be a prototypical striped
apple. (Osherson & Smith 1981, 43.)
The underlying problem is that prototypes encode statistical features; what features happen
to be prototypical is a contingent fact of the world. Consider the concept PET FISH.
Typical pets are somewhat like cats and dogs and other furry animals with tails. Typical
fish, such as trout or salmon, live in waters. If pet fish were composed from the prototypes
of its constituents, then pet fish would probably have fur, wag a tail and live in waters. But
they don't: typical pet fish, such as gold fish, are very small, live in bowls and are brightly
colored. The concept PET FISH cannot be composed from the prototypes of PET and
FISH, so "[i]t follows that if meanings were prototypes, then you could know what 'pet'
means and know what 'fish' means and still not know what 'pet fish' means" (Fodor 1998,
102; emphasis mine). What happens to be a typical pet fish has more to do with fashion
than with the underlying prototypes. One day it could become fashionable to have piranhas
as pet fish. If the prototype of PET FISH is composed from its constituent prototypes, then
they would have to change too. (Fodor 1998, 100-104.)
Another problem follows from the coding of statistical tendency: prototypes don't fix
references properly. The prototype of tigers refers only to prototypical tigers. But a three
legged, toothless, albino tiger is still a tiger, albeit not a very prototypical one, and should
be included in the extension of TIGER. A prototypical grandmother is presumably old, has
gray hair and glasses, bakes cookies and is kind to children. The problem is that this does
not fix the extension of GRANDMOTHER properly. Somebody can have these features
without being a grandmother and grandmothers are not always prototypical grandmothers.
Whoopi Goldberg and Tina Turner are grandmothers also. (Laurence & Margolis 1999,
34).
The problems of compositionality and reference fixing have been noticed by the defenders
of the prototype theory and some repairements have been done (see for example Smith &
al. (1988)). What if the improvements to the theory or to the fuzzy set operations somehow
overcome the problems? Will this help? No. Putnam's criticism against the classical theory
applies to the prototype theory as well. In the end, the only difference is that where the
classical theory demands that the features are necessary, the prototype theory relaxes this
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demand to a statistical tendency. But it is nonetheless a descriptivist account and suffers
from the same problems of ignorance and error. How can we ever be sure that our
description is the correct one? A prototypical lemon is sour and yellow and typically tigers
have stripes. But again, what if lemons really are blue or if future tigers turn out to be
stripeless? Lemons would still be lemons and tigers would still be tigers, even though our
prototypes of them would now be far from prototypical. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 34.)
After all, it seems that we can perfectly well possess a concept without knowing its
prototype - compositionality generates an endless number of such counter examples to the
prototype theory. It then follows that the prototype theory cannot tell the whole story of
concepts. There might be some concepts that are prototypes, but for a vast amount of them
a different story is needed. The current status of the prototype theory is that it is not a
theory of representations. This conclusion was even admitted by Rosch herself:
What the work summarized does not tell us, however, is considerably more
than it tells us. The pervasiveness of prototypes in real-world categories and of
prototypicality as a variable indicates that prototypes must have some place in
psychological theories of representation, processing, and learning. However,
prototypes themselves do not constitute any particular model of processes,
representations, or learning. (Rosch 1978, 39).
This does not mean that prototype effects aren't real. There probably is little doubt
concerning the experimental data and whatever the final grand theory of concepts is, it
must explain the prototype effects:
Insofar as theses get established in cognitive psychology, I think we can take
the reality of prototype structure as read. (Fodor 1981, 293).
One enormous phenomenon stands firm: subjects do give graded responses
when queried, in any number of ways, about concepts. So powerful is this
phenomenon that it survives even confrontation with the very concepts (odd
number) it could not possibly illuminate or even describe. (Armstrong & al.
1983, 291).
The discovery of the massive presence of prototypicality effects in all sorts of
mental processes is one of the success stories of cognitive science. (Fodor
1998, 93).
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2.5 The dual theories
2.5.1 The core and the identification procedure
The classical model suffers from the inability to explain typicality effects whereas the
prototype model has its own weaknesses. This has led some researchers to postulate dual
theories where concepts are in the end classical (to explain compositionality), but where
prototype effects rise due to performance restrictions (to explain prototype effects). For
example, concepts can have a classical "core", but some "identification procedure" is
responsible for the rise of typicality effects. Prototypes are called upon when classification
needs to be done fast and with inadequate data. The classical core is called into work when
there are no performance limitations and more considerate classification is needed.
(Osherson & Smith 1981, 57; Armstrong & al. 1983, 292.)
This could well explain why Armstrong & al. paradoxically achieved prototype effects for
concepts that are classical, concepts for which it didn't even make sense to rate their
goodness. As in the category ODD NUMBER, participants produced typicality effects, but
still claimed that all the members of the category are equally good examples. Maybe they
used the identification procedure when asked to rank the members for their goodness, but
when asked to think more carefully they consulted the classical core and realized that the
category is after all all-or-none. (Armstrong & al. 1983, 293.)
2.5.2 The continuum version
Pinker & Prince (1999) propose a variant theory, which I will shall the continuum version.
According to it, both categories are psychologically real. The two kinds of concepts can
live side-by-side in the mind and exist for different purposes: the family-resemblance
system is responsible for recording correlational clusters of properties in the world and the
classical system is responsible for ignoring statistical correlations and finding idealized
scientific laws and hidden essences behind the observable properties. (Pinker & Prince
1999, 32-39).
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It looks like the family resemblance system is highly adapted for categorizing a world
where evolution has a tendency to break classes into not so well-defined classes. Mutations
and other natural forces cause variations in biological populations, but similar processes
shape the evolution of languages too; languages are influenced by other languages, which
cause irregularities and oddities in the language systems. The resulting dirty and fuzzy
categories cannot be handled using a classical category. Nature is full of classes of this
type. On the other hand, once we ignore the fuzziness and the ragged edges of the real
world and abstract, we are able to find firm classical categories. Science is all about
idealization. The laws of geometry and physics are idealizations: there are no perfect
geometrical figures or frictionless planes that objects follow. Once we selectively ignore
unimportant things we can rise above the perceptual world and find the underlying laws of
nature. Without classical categories science would not be possible. Moreover, there are
plenty of human-made categories, such as legal definitions, that really are not sharp, but
we force them to be so. For example, legally "adult" and "region" are clearly defined, but
in reality they are not; the difference between an adult and a child is of course graded and
so is the border between two regions. With such different utilities it is possible to imagine
that both types of conceptual systems are handy.
Classical categories are defined by formal rules and allow us to make
inferences within idealized law-governed systems. Family resemblance
categories are defined by correlations among features in sets of similar
memorized exemplars, and allow us to make inferences about the observable
products of history. (Pinker & Prince 1999, 47).
The following four imagined worlds clarify the need to have both types of category
systems. The worlds contain a pool of objects with just three properties A, B and C. First is
a classical, law-governed world (Pinker & Prince 1999, 39-41; numbering changed and I
added the fourth world):
(1)
ABC
ABC
ABC
ABC
DEF
DEF
DEF
DEF
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In this beautiful world classical categories are extremely useful. An observer can build two
groups X and Y and predict with absolute certainty to which group any object belongs to
with just, say, finding the first property. Internalizing laws like A -> BC and D -> EF
makes life a lot easier. All one has to do is to find one single property - the rest can be
inferred.
This kind of world could evolve in an isolated and stable environment where the
population is left to live for a long time in peace. Similar process could happen to a
language that has no influence from other languages and the language speakers over
generations slowly omit or forget all the annoying irregularities and exceptions of the
language.
Second is an example of a world that has evolved from divergent processes. Mutations and
influences have broken the two previously neat categories into family resemblance
categories, where the individuals are only loosely connected:
(2)
ABC
ABR
PBC
AQC
DEF
DER
PEF
DQR
In this world, laws don't apply anymore. It still isn't a jungle yet, because an observer can
build family resemblance categories and classify objects with at least some probability. It
looks like As are still dominant in the first category and Ds in the second. Observing that
an object has A, then it belongs to the first category and once it is in there one can predict
with probability 0.753 that it has B. This is a lot better than 0.375 which is the rate of Bs in
all objects. The probability is not 1.0 as in the world (1), but it is still useful enough to go
through the trouble of building categories.
The world (3) is a random world, where divergent processes have caused a havoc:
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(3)
ABC
ABF
AEC
AEF
DBC
DBF
DEC
DEF
Building categories in this world is not helpful; the probability of B, C, E or F occurring is
always 0.5. Although there is nothing to gain from categorizing this world it can still be
classified into two groups by the first property, which is either A or D. Pinker & Prince's
list can be continued with one more world which is entirely chaotic:
(4)
DEC
QBA
BCE
BFA
QFE
AEF
PBC
EAD
This world cannot even be categorized; all the members have to be memorized in a rote
learning fashion.
All in all, it looks like there is a continuum from random worlds to family resemblance
worlds and finally to clean, law-like worlds. Processes can diverge a nicely evolved law-
governed world into a family resemblance world. And finally, the family resemblance
world can break into a chaotic random mess. On the other hand, convergent processes can
converge family resemblances from a random world and then finally tidy the world into an
ideal law-governed classical world again. Thus, a mind equipped with both classical and
prototype categories plus a rote learning mechanism can take the best out of any world.
2.5.3 Criticism of the dual theories
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The dual theories attempt to get the best of both worlds. Unfortunately, they also drag
along all the problems from both worlds. The problem that practically no definitions have
been found is still very much a problem. Even if some were found, we could not sit back
with a peace of mind knowing that the definition is certainly the correct one; for all we
know, the world might be entirely different tomorrow. Adding the prototype theory on top
of the classical theory does not sweep away these original problems. (Laurence & Margolis
1999, 34.)
2.6 The neoclassical theory
2.6.1 Back to definitions
The neoclassical theory is an update to the classical theory. Instead of claiming that
concepts are full-blown definitions the neoclassical theory postulates that concepts encode
only partial definitions. The partial definitions don't do the entire job of explaining what
concepts are, something else is also needed, but, nonetheless, neoclassicists assume that
concepts do have some kind of definitions and this ties them to the classical theory. For
example, the concept TIGER must at least contain the concept THING, and RED must at
least contain COLOR as its constituent. It is evident that these necessary conditions are not
sufficient to explain concepts: something more than THING is needed to distinguish tigers
from bats and equally COLOR is not sufficient to distinguish red from green. Concepts,
then, according to the neoclassical theory are structured representations that encode partial
necessary conditions - plus something else on top of this. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 52.)
The motivation for assuming partial definitions probably comes from observations of
similarities in linguistic expressions. The following four expressions are all different, but at
the same time they seem polysemic - there is something highly similar in them (Jackendoff
1989, 84; numbering changed):
i. Harry kept the bird in the cage.
ii. Susan kept the money.
iii. Sam kept the crowd happy.
iiii. Let's keep the trip on Saturday.
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Now, according to Jackendoff there is a single rule behind all these keep sentences - a rule
that unites their different meaning: "The keep sentences all denote the causation of a state
that endures over a period of time" (Jackendoff 1989, 84). As was said, the rule is a partial
definition; there has to be more to sentence meaning, but the meanings must in minimum
encode the partial definition as a necessary condition for the application of KEEP.
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, 53.)
2.6.2 Criticism of the neoclassical theory
The obvious criticism against any theory that postulates partial definitions is that unless the
theory explains how concepts are individuated it is not a finished theory. Partial definitions
are simply not enough. Even though the keep sentences might contain the partial definition
mentioned (although not everybody agrees with it, see for example Fodor (1998, 50,
footnote 7)) it does not fully explain the different meanings between the sentences. The
partial definition needs to be turned into a full definition. Now, the problem is that this full
definition will sadly be a classical definition and it is well known that it can't be made to
work. Moreover, if the neoclassical theory doesn't come up with an alternative to the
classical theory it has not provided anything new. So, in order to make the theory work
partial definitions must be converted to full explanations of a concept's/sentence's identity,
but they need to take a different route than the classical theory. What this route is, is left
unanswered. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 54.)
Second, problems arise if we focus on the partial definitions more carefully. The partial
definition CAUSE A STATE THAT ENDURES OVER TIME contains at least the
concepts CAUSE, STATE, TIME and ENDURE always. These concepts are invoked in
every meaning of KEEP, so they are "univocal", that is their meaning remains the same,
whereas the state that is kept the same or the agent that causes the state are variables that
change in every sentence. How are CAUSE and the rest to be explained? If they encode
partial definitions, then the same question pops up for their definitions and again in those
definitions. In order stop at some point, we must reach concepts embedded in partial
definitions that no longer encode partial definitions. These concepts are not neoclassical, so
another story is needed to explain them. But couldn't this story be applied already to
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CAUSE? If so, why couldn't the same story be applied to KEEP itself and simply forget
about the partial definitions? (Fodor 1998, 52.)
Why not just say that 'keep' is univocal because it always means keep; just as,
in order to avoid the regress, Jackendoff is required to say that 'CAUSE' is
univocal because it always means cause. Or, quite generally, why not just say
that all words are univocal across semantic fields because semantic fields don't
affect meaning. (Fodor 1998, 52).
2.7 The theory-theory
The classical and prototype theories try to explain concepts using their properties. The
theory-theory asks us to conceive concepts in fundamentally different terms. According to
it, concepts are not defined by a list of properties, but by the role they play in our theories
and explanations about the world. Their structure is the relation to other concepts
determined by some mental theories.
Concepts are constituents of beliefs; that is, propositions are represented by
structures of concepts. Theories are complex mental structures consisting of a
mentally represented domain of phenomena and explanatory principles that
account for them. (Carey 1991, 258).
The important difference to the previous theories is that concept's identity is no longer
explained by the Containment Model, where concepts have other concepts as their
structure. Instead, concept's identity is explained by the Inferential Model, where the
structure is determined by the relation it plays to other concepts. When theories change, so
do the identities of the concepts that are embedded in the theories. Theories, according to
the theory-theorists, do not need to be mature scientific theories. What is meant by
"theory" is loosely any kinds of theories or explanations used by adults and children.
When we argue that concepts are organized by theories, we use theory to mean
any of a host of mental "explanations," rather than a complete, organized,
scientific account. For example, causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory
of certain phenomena; scripts may contain an implicit theory of the entailment
relations between rule constituents; and book-learned, scientific knowledge
certainly contains theories. Although it may seem to be glorifying some of
these cases to call them theories, the term connotes a complex set of relations
between concepts, usually with a causal basis. (Murphy & Medin 1985, 290).
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Some theory-theorist even go to the extreme relativist view of claiming that people with
radically different theories do not share the same concepts at all and that it is impossible to
describe the concepts of one theory to another; the two conceptual systems are claimed to
be incommensurable and their respective languages untranslatable (Carey 1991). Carey
cites as examples the 17th century physicist thermal theories. They fused together the
concepts HEAT and TEMPERATURE, but for the scientist of today these two concepts
"[...] are two entirely different types of physical magnitudes; heat is an extensive quantity,
whereas temperature is an intensive quantity" (Carey 1991, 463). According to Carey,
these differences in concepts must be explained by the underlying theory.
The only way to distinguish these two alternative representational states of
affairs (false belief in perfect correlation and absence of one or the other
concept) from conceptual nondifferentation is to analyze the roles that the
concepts played in the theories in which they were embedded. (Carey 1991,
464).
Another example cited by Carey is the incommensurable differences in child's and adult's
concepts of weights and densities of objects. For the adult mind it is, we are told,
impossible to understand how the child could think that a particular piece of Styrofoam is
weightless or that the weight of an object changes when it is turned on its side. (Carey
1991, 468.)
The child's language cannot be translated into the adult's without a gloss. One
cannot simply state the child's beliefs in terms of adult concepts - the child
believes that air is not material, but the "air" in that sentence as it expresses the
child's belief is not our "air", and the "material" is not our material. (Carey
1991, 484).
The theory-theory has a great advantage in explaining what might have gone wrong in the
feature-based theories, namely the classical and the prototype. These theories rely on
features to explain concept's identity, but they have nothing to say why certain features are
chosen and why they are more important than others. Concepts are grouped together by
their similarity, but similarity itself is left undefined. A toy-tiger is very similar to a real
tiger; it probably has many of the features that a real tiger has: four legs, stripes, tail, teeth,
etc. In this regard, a toy-tiger is similar to a tiger, but a toy-tiger is not a tiger. By properly
choosing features one can make almost any object similar to another. Plums and
lawnmower are very similar if we note that both weight less than 10 000 kg., both did not
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exist 10 000 000 years ago, both cannot hear well, both can be dropped, both take up
space, etc. It seems that the notion of similarity needs to be constrained and this could be
accomplished by a theory. (Murphy & Medin 1985, 291.)
The problem with the abstract notion of similarity is that it ignores both the
perceptual and theory-related constraints on concepts, when in fact they are
doing most of the explanatory work. [...] Thus, we attempt to provide part of
the answer to how people choose relevant attributes for concepts and how they
weight those attributes in their conceptual processes. (Murphy & Medin 1985,
292).
What features are chosen as being important could be explained by an underlying theory.
A bird has wings and is light weighted, because it is an animal that flies; birds nest in trees,
because it protects them from predators. Our knowledge about birds can help us deduce
what features are correlated with the concept (Murphy & Medin 1985, 300). Similarly, all
kinds of behavior is related to being drunk, such as jumping into a swimming pool with
clothes on, dancing on the tables and howling on the streets. It is hard to believe that such
features would be part of the structure of the concept. Instead, we can explain these
features if we know that drunken people tend to do all kinds of silly things (Murphy &
Medin 1985, 295).
2.7.1 The principle of psychological essentialism
People's judgement about what defines a category seems to be quite independent of
features. There is increasing evidence that what defines a category is not some bundle of
observable features, but some hidden essence (or a hidden property) or an appropriate
internal structure. This principle is called psychological essentialism. Even 3-year old
children have been noted to rely on essentialist thinking. When asked which resembles a
pig, a piggy bank or a cow, children choose the piggy bank, but when asked which has the
same kind of insides, they choose the cow; they could reasonably have chosen the piggy
bank - why wouldn't two objects that look alike have the same insides? Children also think
that it's what's inside that counts. If a dog is removed from its outsides, the fur, the tail and
the rest, it still remains dog. But if the insides are tempered with, changing the blood and
the bones and so on, then, according to 3-year old children, it seizes to be a dog. Children
also tend to think that the essence determines how the object will potentially look and
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behave in the future. A rabbit that is raised among monkeys will still have long ears as an
adult and eat carrots, not bananas. (Gelman & Wellman 1991.)
It looks like some kind of a psychological essence determines an object's identity - not an
n-tuple of features. Objects can go through drastic changes in their appearance, but still
retain their identity - think of a seed developing into an apple or a caterpillar evolving into
a butterfly. The theory-theory can provide an account of why people are essentialist: it is
the theory that is the essence and it explains why certain features are considered to be
characteristic for a particular concept at a particular moment and how those features are
connected with each other.
2.7.2 Criticism of the theory-theory
The theory-theory seems to get away from the problems that we have encountered before:
we might be mistaken about the features associated with a concept or might not know at all
what they are. A theory can possibly explain what features are important for a concept.
But, if we think more carefully, don't we have the same problems of ignorance and error
for the theories? How do we know that our theory is the correct one? Theories can and do
change over time as did the theories of disease. It seems that the criticism that the theory-
theory was supposed to solve can equally well be applied against it. Our definition or a
prototype of a concept can be mistaken, but so can a theory. One can explain the existence
of humans by a theory of evolution or by a divine creation or by whatever, but if all these
theories talk about the same thing, then the theory seems to be irrelevant for that thing.
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, 47.)
In fact, in many, if not most cases we might not have the slightest clue about the theories
behind our concepts. Most people do not know enough about the state-of-the-art theories of
chemistry, physics or economics in order to talk about water, gravity or inflation. The point
is that they don't need to.
The suggestion seems to be that the difference between prototype theories and
theory theories is that the latter entail that having a concept involves knowing
the explanation of such correlations [...]. But, if so, it seems that theory theories
set the conditions for concept possession impossibly high. I'm pretty confident
39
that being liquid and transparent at room temperature are correlated properties
of water. But I have no idea why they are correlated. Notice, in particular, that
learning that being water is being H2O didn't advance my epistemic situation in
this respect since I don't know why being liquid and transparent at room
temperature are correlated properties of H2O. Do you? (Fodor 1998, 118,
footnote 26).
The problems of ignorance and error haunted definitions and prototypes, but, as can be
seen, they haunt equally well the theory-theory; it is a descriptivist view and hence a target
for Putnam's criticism.
Theory-theory relies on the principle of psychological essentialism, but psychological
essentialism itself does not entail that the essence must be a theory. All that is needed is
that there is some sort of an essence that people know and rely on when categorizing and
explaining the behavior of objects. Therefore, this essence could equally well be, for
example, a classical definition.
The notion of an essence i[s] the hypothesis that objects possess constitutive
natures that make them what they are, that such an underlying nature is distinct
from but responsible for more obvious external features. Having stripes is not
essential to being a tiger, but it may be the direct consequence of having a tiger
essence. Positing that there are essences does not mean identifying what those
essences are; in fact, essences are typically hidden and unknown. (Gelman &
Wellman 1991, 242).
Theory-theory should then provide solid arguments for why the essence of a concept is a
theory and not something else. But the problem is that theory-theorists have not come
forward with a precise specification of what a theory even is. Murphy and Medin "[...]
agree that theories are made up of concepts (to a great extent) and urge that this fact be
employed in our theories of concepts" (1985, 313). But what does the expression "to a
great extent" mean and, by the way, why is it bracketed? If theories are nothing else than
concepts, then it is hard to see how in the end the theory-theory differs from other theories.
If, however, theories are something else than concepts, then we are not told what they
really are. Although at first glance appealing, the theory-theory needs to come up with a
precise account of what is meant by "theory". (Fodor 1998, 117.)
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2.8 The atomistic theory
The final theory of concepts we will consider is the atomistic theory. The motivation
behind the atomistic theory is the failure of the descriptive or structural theories of
concepts. We have seen again and again the downfall of descriptions: concepts aren't
definitions, nor prototypes, nor theories. This isn't to say that they have nothing to do with
concepts. There certainly are prototype effects, maybe some definitions, and all kinds of
idiosyncratic and cultural information as well attached to concepts. Someone's concept
MONEY can include information that money makes the world go round or that it is the
root of all evil. Money can be a symbol of success and power. Someone, say an expert,
might even invent a bullet-proof definition for MONEY. Someone can have a theory of
why money makes the world go round or why it doesn't. All types of descriptive
information is associated to concepts. The point is that all this information seems to be
collateral - it is not constitutive of concepts' identity. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 64.)
The atomistic theory takes an entirely different approach to concepts. Since any type of
description attached to concepts is a target of Putnam's criticism of ignorance and error, the
atomistic theory claims that concepts are completely unstructured. Concepts, especially
most lexical concepts, according to it are atomistic.
[...] 'What is the structure of the mental representation DOG?'
And my answer will be that, on the evidence available, it's reasonable to
suppose that such mental representations have no structure; it's reasonable to
suppose that they are atoms. (Fodor 1998, 22).
The view that concepts are atomistic applies uniquely to lexical concepts. Phrasal concepts
patently have structure, which simply is the constituents of the concept, that is, the concept
BLACK CAT has as its structure the concepts BLACK and CAT. The important claim is
that lexical concepts do not have any structure at all - they are primitive.
In the end, the atomistic theory is very close to the classical one. The only difference is that
according to the classical theory the primitive level of concepts is supposed to be very
small and simple, whereas the atomistic theory lifts up this level - it lifts it up all the way to
the lexical level of language. This is the primitive level after which concepts do not
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decompose any further. Therefore, the primitive level, according to the atomistic view,
contains a massive amount of concepts and is far from simple.
The advantage of the atomistic theory is that it is safe from Putnam's criticism, because it is
free to postulate any amount of structure/description to concepts; this structure is
irrelevant, so we can be mistaken or ignorant about it, but still be able to possess a concept.
But, how is concept's identity determined if it isn't by its structure? In other words, if the
structure does not matter, then how can atomistic concepts, such as CAT and DOG, differ?
The answer is that concepts work only for reference determination. Concepts are said to be
triggered or activated by the appropriate things in the world. DOORKNOB is triggered by
doorknobs, CAT is triggered by cats and so on. The only thing that matters is that the
concept is in the right mind-world relationship. This relationship is causal: CAT expresses
cats, if it is activated only by cats and not by carburetors. This is what determines concept's
identity - not some structure, but a correct relationship to things out in the world.
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, 60.)
2.8.1 Radical nativism
Primitive concepts, according to the atomistic viewpoint, are also innately known. So, in
order to know which concepts belong to the innate, primitive base, we should check which
lexical concepts decompose, that is, have definitions. Concepts that have definitions are
not innately known, because they can be built from the primitive base. But, because there
are practically no definitions for lexical concepts, it follows that most, if not all, lexical
concepts are innately known. Hence, the atomistic theory leads to radical nativism. (Fodor
1975, 124-156; Fodor & al. 1980; Fodor 1998, 124.)
The conclusion that primitive concepts are known innately follows from a theory of how
concepts are learned. The only learning method that can explain concept learning is
inductive learning (Fodor 1998, 123). This is the process of constructing hypotheses to
explain a given data and choosing the best hypothesis among competing ones. In order to
learn a concept, say BACHELOR, the learner needs to find the correct properties/concepts
that apply for things that fall under BACHELOR. After several trials the learner will
choose the best hypothesis, which in this case might be that the concept BACHELOR
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applies to UNMARRIED MALE. Inductive learning hence presupposes the following
mechanical apparatus for learning (based on Fodor 1975, 42):
1. A format for representing the experiential data
2. A source of hypotheses for predicting future data
3. A metric which determines the level of confirmation that a given body of
data bestows upon a given hypotheses
So, now that the learner has learned the concept BACHELOR from UNMARRIED and
MALE, we can ask how those concepts are learned? The same way. But this process
cannot go on forever. Therefore at some level the learner must already possess concepts
that haven't been learned inductively, but since inductive learning is the only known way to
learn concepts, it follows that these concepts are not learned at all. Hence, inductive
learning presupposes an innate language in which the hypotheses are couched - this
language of thought, in which the representations and hypotheses are carried out and
evaluated, must be semantically at least as powerful as any natural language that we can
ever learn.
The upshot would appear to be that one can learn L [some natural language]
only if one already knows some language rich enough to express the extension
of any predicate of L. To put it tendentiously, one can learn what the semantic
properties of a term are only if one already knows a language which contains a
term having the same semantic properties. (Fodor 1975, 80).
2.8.2 Criticism of the atomistic theory
One undesirable and implausible upshot of the atomistic theory is the commitment to a
massive amount of innate concepts. If a concept doesn't have a definition, then it must be
primitive and hence innate. The search for definitions for lexical concepts has failed and so
have all other efforts to find any empirical evidence that some lexical concepts might be
more complex than others (see Fodor 1975, 124-156; Fodor & al. 1980). If this is the case,
then the inevitable and bold conclusion is that most lexical concepts are innate, meaning
that we are genetically endowed with concepts such as DOORKNOB, MAFIA, MUFFIN
and WALKMAN. Somewhere something must have gone wrong in the argumentation.
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Or maybe not. People do have a strong intuition that most concepts must be learned,
including lexical concepts, but in the end this is nothing but an intuition. If one looks at the
evidence, as I suppose scientist should do, then the conclusion does follow. Since some
concepts must be primitive, assuming compositionality, and they cannot be learned,
assuming inductive learning, then primitive concepts are innately known. Complex
concepts are learned, but because there is no evidence that lexical concepts are complex,
then they must be primitive and hence innate. After all, the argument against radical
nativism is nothing more than a gut feeling and gut feelings can be false.
The moral, then, is this: what is not definable must be innate. Most of us are
inclined to assume that it just can't be the case that all concepts are innate;
most of us have therefore thought that many - indeed, very many - concepts
must be definable. This is a persuasive line of argument if Empiricism is true.
But what if Empiricism isn't true? (Fodor & al. 1980, 282).
But the atomistic view is not without its problems. If concepts are individuated only by
their reference, then the theory runs into old problems encountered long ago by Frege. In
modal contexts the meaning of concepts cannot be solely their reference, because terms
such as "Muhamed Ali" and "Cassius Clay" have the same reference, but not necessarily
the same meaning. For example, a person might believe that Muhamed Ali is the greatest
boxer of all times, but he might not believe that Cassius Clay is the greatest boxer of all
times. The reason is that he might not know that, in fact, Muhamed Ali is Cassius Clay. If
meaning is only reference, then the above beliefs should always have the same meanings,
which they don't. Same problem applies to empty concepts, such as JEDI or SANTA
CLAUS, both of which don't have references at all. If reference is all there is to meaning,
then how do empty concepts get their meaning? The way out of this problem was to
postulate descriptions/intentions for concepts. If this is the only way out, then the atomistic
theory is in trouble. (Laurence & Margolis 1999, 69.)
Second problem is the problem of misrepresentation. It is natural to be sometimes mistaken
about things we perceive. In a dark and a rainy night we might mistakenly believe that a
cow on the field is a horse. So cows in this case trigger the concept HORSE, but in normal
cases horses trigger it. If horses and cows (and possibly many other things) can trigger
HORSE, then the concept does not make any difference between them; it stands in a causal
relation to many other things than horses. But HORSE is not the same concept as COW. It
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should be triggered only by horses and COW by cows and so on. (Laurence & Margolis
1999, 60.)
Atomistic concepts are claimed to be safe from the problems of ignorance and error,
because they don't have structure. But I think this really is not the case. The previous
problems already hinted that we can be mistaken and ignorant about the reference of a
concept. Somebody might believe that Michael Jackson is the king of pop. This
information and possibly much more is encoded in his concept of Michael Jackson, but it
can be the case that he might still not know the reference of the concept. That is, he might
not recognize Michael Jackson on the street. Moreover, he might mistakenly think that the
pop artist Michael Jackson is the same person as the beer and wines expert called Michael
Jackson. If this is the case, then the problems of ignorance and error are back again. One
way out is to claim that not even the reference is constitutive of concepts, but if neither
structure nor reference plays any role in determining the identity of concepts, then what
does?
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3. KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
3.1 The role of knowledge representation
"There is a sense in which every computer program contains knowledge about the problem
it is solving." (Torsun 1995, 113). Knowledge representation, a subtopic of AI, studies how
knowledge is organized and processed, what kind of data structures an intelligent agent
uses and what kind of reasoning can and cannot be done with the knowledge. Given the
computational framework of the mind, it doesn't make a difference if we are studying the
mind or a computer. In both cases we need representations and data structures to represent
that knowledge. Any problem solving task presupposes some sort of a knowledge
representation. The psychologically interesting question is to find out what type or types of
knowledge representations the mind uses. (Partridge 1996, 55.)
For example, a mental lexicon can be organized in the memory as a list or as a set. These
two different structures permit different operations. A list encodes the order of the words
whereas a set, by definition, is ignorant of the order of the items. So, a list allows us to
query the first word, the second word, the third word, etc. This is not possible using a set.
Whether we use a set or a list depends on the psychological theory that is modeled. If,
according to it, the order of words is important, then a list needs to be used, if not, a set is
acceptable. If a set is enough, then we need further precision of how to implement it. Using
a hashtable would guarantee a constant search time (Weiss 1998, 553). Questions like
these need to be addressed by the knowledge engineer, but after a certain point of precision
some programming details are irrelevant to the psychological theory that is being modeled;
whether we use for or while loops is most likely only an issue of programming
technique. (Partridge 1996, 55.)
Knowledge representation has a vital role to play in AI, because it determines to a very
large extent what kind of reasoning can be done with the knowledge, how fast it is, how
much memory is consumed and how optimal and complete the algorithms that utilize the
knowledge are. There are many different types of knowledge representations all having
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their ups and downs. Torsun lists some criteria for evaluating them (Torsun 1995, 113-114;
some items omitted and numbering changed):
(1) Semantics: representations are usually intended as a medium for conveying
meanings about some world or environment. A representation must therefore
have a semantic theory which provides an account in which a particular
representation corresponds to the external world or environment.
(2) Expressive adequacy: What knowledge can and cannot be represented?
(3) Naturalness: in some sense all knowledge can be represented in binary
form. Such knowledge representation, however, will be very difficult to
understand, update or reason with.
(4) Reasoning: how sound and complete is the reasoning or inferencing
mechanism? How efficient is the deductive process?
(5) Primitives: what are the primitives (if any) in knowledge representation?
(6) Incompleteness: how complete is the knowledge? Can the system reason
with such a knowledge base?
(7) Revisable reasoning: a good deal of what we know about the world is
"almost always" true. How could such revisable reasoning be formalized and
computed?
(8) Flexibility: the ability to add new pieces of knowledge easily and freely.
From the perspective of this study, it is mostly the third point that bears importance:
basically anything can be done with anything, but the question is how natural is the OO
knowledge representation for representing conceptual knowledge? The following chapters
will be briefly look at other knowledge representation systems from a purely psychological
perspective before turning into the OO one.
3.2 Knowledge representation systems
3.2.1 Logic
Logic is probably the oldest form of knowledge representation. It is a well-known system
with well-known semantics. "It provides a mathematically precise account of how a
formalism can describe and reason about entities outside the computer" (Torsun 1995,
116). Logic is also a productive system that allows an infinite amount of complex
expressions to be composed from simpler ones. Once we know certain facts, premises we
can deduce what other facts follow from them. These inferences are rigid and truth
preserving. The standard logic has also been extended to predicate calculus, intentional
logic and nonmonotonic logic. (Niemelä 1993, 116-124; Torsun 1995, 115-124.)
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Logic is a well-suited general-purpose formalism for expressing knowledge about many
domains. It certainly has its merits in AI applications, but cognitive science is more
concerned about how much it says about human reasoning. Unfortunately, not much. It
looks like people don't reason with such rigor and precision as logicians would wish.
Instead, human reasoning uses probabilities and analogies. For example, humans can apply
the logical rule modus ponens much more successfully than modus tollens and also think
that the conclusion follows more likely in modus ponens than in modus tollens. (Anderson
1995, 307-321; Thagard 1996, 35-39.)
In the Wason's selection task participants are given four cards. All cards have two sides. In
one side there is a letter and on the other there is a number. They are then given a rule if a
card has an A on one side, then it has 2 on the other side. Participants are finally asked to
decide which of the four cards need to be checked necessarily to see if the rule is true
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991, 75):
  A   B   2   3
Only few participants get the correct answer, which is A and 3. Most people understand
that turning A is necessary. This can be interpreted that they are using modus ponens; the
rule was if A, then 2 and since the premise A is true, it should be verified that the
conclusion is also true. But this is not enough. The card 3 needs to be checked too, because
if there is an A on the other side, then it would falsify the rule. Only few choose to check
the card 3. On the other hand, many elect to turn the cards 2 and B, both of which are
uninformative choices and cannot falsify the rule. (Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972, 173;
Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991, 75.)
The Wason experiment indicates that people are not formal logicians. Participants with a
formal schooling in logic performed no better (Johnson-Laird & Wason 1972, 175).
However, once people are given concrete examples from everyday life they perform
extremely well. For example, if the rule is if a person is in the bar, then he or she is over
21 and the cards are labeled IN-BAR, NOT-IN-BAR, 23, 18, then most people perform
well and understand to check the card 18 also, that is to apply modus tollens. It seems that
concrete examples are easier for people. If people were formal logicians they should
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perform equally well on both tasks. (Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972, 191; Johnson-Laird &
Byrne 1991, 77.)
All in all, logic seems to be a prescriptive, not a descriptive, science. It says how people
should think if they were to think logically, but it has not much to say about how people
actually think.
3.2.2 Production systems
Production systems (Nuuttila 1993, 125-133; Torsun 1995, 124-133) are a form of
knowledge representation where the knowledge is represented in a list of rules. Rules are
encoded in a set of if-then clauses. The rules contain conditions and actions that fire if the
conditions are satisfied. The rule base can contain any amount of rules and corresponds to
long-term memory, because its state rarely changes, whereas the short-term memory holds
the data or the facts that are manipulated by the rules and its state changes continuously.
The interpreter is responsible for searching the rule base and finding the rule(s) that match
the current facts, that is, the interpreter checks the state of the facts in the working memory
and then searches the rule base, the long term memory, to find clauses that match the facts.
In case where there are several matching rules, the interpreter must use some strategy to
resolve conflicts. These include e.g., adding priorities to the rules, deleting rules already
executed or using the rule that has been used most recently (Nuuttila 1993, 129).
The interpreter continues this match-select-execute loop until it finds no more rules that
satisfy a condition, it encounters a halt command or exceeds the number of loops allowed.
At this stage the interpreter stops and hopefully the goal of the system is accomplished.
A rule base might, for example, contain following rules (Anderson 1995, 248):
If the goal is to drive a standard transmission car
and the car is in first gear
and the car is going more than 10 miles an hour,
Then shift the car into second gear
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Production systems offer many advantages. They are flexible. Adding, deleting or
modifying rules is relatively easy. They are also modular. Each rule can be seen as an
independent piece of knowledge. Thus, they are easy to maintain, since the knowledge
engineer can fix a particular rule without touching other ones. This also makes learning
easy, because rules can be added and modified as the system learns. As a downside, once
the rule base gets very large it becomes virtually impossible to understand what the system
does and to debug it4. (Nuuttila 1993, 130; Torsun 1995, 132.)
Production systems play also an important role in psychology. They have been used
successfully in AI applications and also in modeling many domains of human cognition
such as planning, decision making and learning (Nuuttila 1993, 131; Torsun 1995, 124;
Thagard 1996, 51). Rules are quite flexible in the sense that they can correspond to all
kinds of things, such as things in the world (if x is retired, then x is old), or to actions (if
you are overspeeding, then break), or to linguistic rules (if x is a verb, then add /ed/ to get
past tense). Rules can have multiple conditions and complex action parts. Compared to
logic, rules are less strict, which is a positive property, because it allows to use rules that
apply as defaults - rules that apply usually, but which can also tolerate some exceptions.
For example, a rule if x is student, then x is overworked can be used as a default, but in
some cases more appropriate rules could match, e.g. if x is a student and taking only easy
courses, then x is not overworked, without creating a contradiction in the system. (Thagard
1996, 43-57.)
Moreover, the current widely-held Chomskian theory of language processing presupposes
an innate Universal Grammar (UG) that contains the rules that generate all possible natural
languages. Language learning is a process where the children's task is to find which rules
of the UG apply to their language environment. English, for example, contains rules such
as if regular verb, then add /ed/ to the stem to get the past tense form or if substantive, then
add /s/ to get the plural form. The important point is that language ability cannot be
explained without rules of the UG. Not any type of rules will do; the rules need to have
recursions to explain the constituent structure of natural language expressions. (Pinker
1994.)
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3.2.3 Frames and scripts
Another approach to representing knowledge is frames and scripts (Minsky 1975; Schank
& Abelson 1977, 36-68; Hayes 1979). A frame is simply a data structure that holds pieces
of information together in its slots. The contents of the slots individuate a frame by giving
it its characteristic values. An example of a frame can be the frame named J.W. Smithy
(Torsun 1995, 139):
Marital status: married
Number of children: None
Married-to: Silvia
Skill: Teaching
Age: 45
As can be seen, different slots can get different types of values; some can be numbers,
some strings, some can even be other frames as in the Married-to slot, which can refer to a
frame named Silvia. Slots can also have default values: the number of children for example
could be zero by default. Slots can also be empty and certain restrictions can constrain
them. The age slot, for example, could only accept values in the range [0,150]. Frames may
also have an IsA link, which makes a frame a subframe of another frame.
Concepts also encode information about the sequence of events. The RESTAURANT
concept might have slots such as ENTERING, ORDERING, EATING and EXITING.
Schank and Abelson (1977, 36-68) call these kinds of concepts "scripts". Scripts are
basically the same thing as frames, but the important difference is that they concentrate on
the order of the attributes. A script is a structure that encodes knowledge about the
appropriate sequence of events in a stereotypical situation or a story. The RESTAURANT
script encodes information that one cannot eat food without having ordered the food first
and one cannot exit a restaurant without first having entered it.
When hearing stories people generally have no difficulty in filling in the blanks that have
been left out. Consider the following stories (Schank & Abelson 1977, 38-39; numbering
changed):
1. John went to a restaurant. He asked the waitress for coq au vin. He paid the
check and left.
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2. John went to Bill's birthday party. Bill opened his presents. John ate the cake
and left.
Both of these stories are understandable, because we have general knowledge about the
world that fills the details left out. We know that John was sitting at a table and probably
had a look at the menu before ordering. We also know that you are expected to pay the
check before you leave a restaurant. Without the script we might be wondering why he
paid a check and what on earth is a waitress. Similarly, we know that it is a custom (in
some cultures) to bring presents and to eat cakes at birthday parties. Storytellers can leave
out this information, because they rely on people knowing it. In fact, stories get very
boring if they describe every minute detail.
Frames and scripts are capable of representing the kind of conceptual knowledge that
intelligent agents possess. Logic and production systems are interested in reasoning and
finding the correct solutions. Frames focus instead on the fact that we possess a vast
amount of conceptual information about all sorts of things in the universe: cats, dogs,
rooms, friends, relatives, enemies, cars, hospitals, politicians, laws, regulations, crime,
revolutions, evolutions, birthday parties, restaurants, etc. Frame-based representation
allows us to encode this knowledge in a manageable way and in a way that pays attention
to the semantics of the information: how things are related and associated with other
things. People know what to expect when entering a room or a car or a restaurant and they
know how to act appropriately in particular situations, such as birthdays and funerals,
because they have prestored knowledge about them. Frames and scripts try to explain what
is the nature and form of this knowledge. How is it organized and accessed. In logic and
production systems, all the conceptual information is encoded separately and is spread all
over the system; they don't have much to say how the information is represented in the
memory. (Hyvönen 1993, 134.)
There is psychological evidence of people possessing concepts with default values.
Participants in a study were asked to wait in an office room while the researcher was
finishing with the previous group. After 35 seconds the participants were taken to a
seminar room and asked to write down what they remembered about the office room.
Participants remembered well items that belong to a typical office room: chairs, desk,
posters and shelves. But only few recalled that there was a bulletin board and a skull. Some
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claimed to have seen books and pens, which there were not. The study is interpreted as
showing that participants have a concept OFFICE ROOM with default values that effect
recall. If people don't remember all the details of a new office room, then the default values
of a corresponding frame stored in the long-term memory are used to fill in the blanks.
(Brewer & Treyens 1981.)
Similar type of results was obtained for scripts. Participants read several stories after which
they were asked to recall what kind of events took place in the stories. Participants recalled
many of the typical events, but they also listed typical events that were not mentioned at all
in the stories. In some of the stories actions were deliberately made to happen in an
unusual order. For example, in a story that takes place in a restaurant, the bill might be paid
before ordering the food and the menu read just before leaving the restaurant. When
recalling these stories participants put many of the events back in their normal order. All
these experiments point to a conclusion that people represent prototypical sequences of
event concepts. These scripts effect recall to the effect that they fill in information that is
otherwise missing and also to the effect they can even distort memory. (Bower & al. 1979.)
Frames can also account for a phenomenon called spreading activation. If one concept is
activated, it spreads its activation to other concepts that are close to it semantically. A chair
can activate other concepts close by, such as desk, living room and furniture.
Computationally this can be done with frames. Once a frame is activated, it can spread the
activation by activating other frames that are connected to it in the slots or in the IsA link.
And when these associated frames activate other frames in turn, the activation will spread
like a wave. (Anderson 1995, 183; Thagard 1996, 63.)
It is quite evident that frames and scripts are very close to the OO knowledge
representation and also to other types of data structures such as records in Pascal and
structs in C. In fact, OO languages can be seen as a computational implementation of
frames (Hyvönen 1993, 139). Classes are equal to frame descriptions and objects are equal
to frame instances after filling in the slots. As frames, objects can have default values. Both
have a link to the superordinate level, that is, they both have an IsA relation.
In general, frames and objects are the same thing. To puzzle things even more the term
"schema" has also been used by psychologists to refer to frames and "event schema" to
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refer to scripts (Anderson 1995, 154, 161; Partridge 1996, 74). For the sake of simplicity
this study will equate all these terms. The question of terminology, whether to talk of
frames or objects, has more to do with a viewpoint - the level at which we look at things
(Partridge 1996, 74). Any knowledge representation system can be implemented at a lower
level with the same programming language. A frame-based knowledge representation can
be implemented in an OO programming language, but it may as well be implemented in a
procedural language. The procedural and OO languages might end up being implemented
with the same lower level language. In the final stage all knowledge is just binary digits.
What matters is how things are seen from a higher viewpoint. Here objects and frames are
both seen as tools for representing knowledge; how they are implemented in the end is
irrelevant. Hence, all the findings that suggest an existence of frame-like representations
equally support the OO knowledge representation.
The following chapters are devoted to the OO knowledge representation, because it
contains a new paradigm that offers features not found in frames. I will also talk more
about scripts when implementing the theory-theory, because it will point out a weakness in
the entire OO knowledge representation.
3.3 The object-oriented knowledge representation
"The object-oriented approach to programming is based on an intuitive correspondence
between a software simulation of a physical system and the physical system itself" (Abadi
& Cardelli 1996, 7). The paradigm rose in the seventies. In traditional paradigms programs
consist of variables and functions that take those variables as arguments and return new,
changed variables. In the OO paradigm programs consist of standalone objects, that
incorporate variables and functions that manipulate them. As a result, the behavior of a
certain object is built into it - it no longer needs to be passed as a variable to a function
somewhere else in the code in order to change its state; this can now be done by directly
manipulating the object. The advantages can be summarized in the following three features
(Abadi & Cardelli 1996, 8):
- The analogy between software models and physical models.
- The resilience of the software models.
- The reusability of the components of the software models.
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Reusability and resilience are issues of programming techniques and are not of interest
here; it is the first feature, the analysis, that we will concentrate on.
A great difference between programs designed with objects, as compared with traditional
paradigms, is that the programs are said to resemble conceptually the actual problem
domain that is being analyzed: the components in the program are equal to the components
in the real world (Abadi & Cardelli 1996, 7; Campione & al. 2001). This changes the way
programs are being designed. In a procedural language the problem domain is first
analyzed, then it is left to the programmer to decide how it can be simulated in a computer.
In OO languages the actual design of the program is more isomorphic to the components
and their behavior in the real world - more precisely, to those components and behaviors
that result from a certain analysis, which of course varies from person to person. Another
advantage is that the programmer and the people who need to use the program can
communicate using the same concepts, because the components of the program and the
real world are the same.
As an example, say a programmer needs to make a program that simulates the behavior of
animals and plants in a forest. In a procedural language this would most likely be
accomplished by creating variables of some sort for each kind of animal and plant and
possibly grouping these variables with tables or linked lists, e.g. all owls could be in a table
and all the flowers in some other table. The actual behavior of the inhabitants of this forest
is accomplished with functions that do something particular, for example, moves its
argument from one tree to an another or makes the passed argument bark. It is up to the
programmer to make sure that an owl is not passed to the bark function or a dog to the fly
function, resulting in weird behavior. A code like this can end up being very complicated
and difficult to maintain - also known as 'spaghetti code'. If a change is needed, the
programmer needs to find the place in the code where this particular change needs to be
done and to make sure that the change does not damage other parts of the program. This
model takes no advantage of the fact that many objects in the forest share some features:
all animals move, have weight and color, etc.
The OO style takes advantage of common features in objects and no difference is made
between variables and functions. All animals could be derived from a common superclass
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Animal, which would incorporate common features shared by all animals. The same way
all plants could have a common superclass. The individual animals would all inherit from
the Animal class: for example, an owl would automatically inherit some behavior common
to all animals, but on top of it, it would add its own behavior, flying, big eyes, etc. This
guarantees also that an owl's behavior is incorporated in the object itself and therefore
cannot be accidentally made to behave in a wrong manner. The programmer calls the move
method of an owl object, which will result in the owl moving in its own specific manner,
probably by flying. A similar call to a snake object will move the snake, probably by
crawling. Making an owl crawl is now impossible, because the data and the functions are
all wrapped in one package.
The big difference introduced with the object-oriented style is that initial
representational commitments are made, more or less equally, to both function
and data. The two are identified, developed and combined on a more or less
equal footing; neither has clear precedence. Furthermore, the computational
model is based on representations of the "objects" identified in the theory.
(Partridge 1996, 62).
Another way of seeing how programs model the world is noticing that originally programs
were written in a machine language, which soon proved to be inhumane. Higher-level
human readable languages with compilers were invented. This way more and more
machine language instructions could be achieved with fewer and fewer higher-level
language instructions. The higher-level instructions were just shortcuts that still pointed to
the underlying machine architecture, but as the languages evolved, the language constructs
no longer pointed to the machine, but instead to the world outside the computer. Objects
are not only shortcuts of machine instructions - they are computer simulations of real
objects.
3.4 Common concepts used in object-oriented languages
The OO language community is very diverse. There are many different languages and
there is no agreed upon common standard constructs, notations or a formalism for
representing them. The following is a very rough overview of common concepts used in
the OO paradigm. There are many languages that have many different features, but the
following concepts are found in most of them. The idea is just to set up some common
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terminology and to see the difference between class-based and object-based languages. The
review is based mostly on Abadi & Cardelli (1996), but also on Arnold & Gosling (1996),
Campione & al. (2001), Hyvönen (1993), Lassila (1993), Niemeyer & Peck (1998),
Partridge (1996), Taivalsaari (1997) and Torsun (1995, 147-160). The reality is much more
diverse: there can be classes inside classes; classes that cannot be subclassed; abstract
classes that cannot be instantiated; classes that only act like interfaces...
3.4.1 Classes
Classes are the fundamental building blocks of objects. A class itself doesn't do anything -
it is a blueprint, a general description of objects created from it. A class defines fields to
hold data and methods that manipulate the data. Fields and methods are collectively called
attributes. Once a class is instantiated you have objects. Objects vary in what the values of
their fields are, but what attributes they all share is defined by their class, which is also
called their signature or type or interface.
As an example, the class Planet can define fields weight, temperature, distance from the
Sun, number of moons, etc. All objects instantiated from this class have these attributes
with some values. A programmer can instantiate nine planets from this class to model our
solar system setting the values correctly for Venus, Mercury, Earth and the rest.
Here is a declaration of simple class called Point, which represents points on a two-
dimensional plane (the pseudo-notation is taken from Abadi & Cardelli (1996)):
class Point is
var x: Integer := 0;
var y: Integer := 0;
method getX(): Integer is
return self.x;
end;
method getY(): Integer is
return self.y;
end;
method setX(x: Integer) is
self.x := x;
end;
method setY(y: Integer) is
self.y := y;
end;
end;
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The Point class has two integer fields, x and y, that mark an object's current position. Both
are initially set to zero. It has also two methods to retrieve those values and two methods to
set the values. With the set methods objects can be moved on the plane. All point objects
created from this class have these attributes. The x and y values can, of course, (and
should) differ between objects.
3.4.2 Objects
OO languages, like the name suggests, are based on objects. An object can be made to
represent anything: a file, a rock-band, a number, a court order, Socrates, a birthday party,
earthquake, etc. Objects are behavioral units that a programmer can manipulate in order to
achieve the intended behavior. Objects are construed of fields and methods to manipulate
those fields. An object's state at a certain moment is the values of its fields.
From the Point class objects can be instantiated to represent points on a plane. The
following instructions create two objects from the Point class:
var firstPoint: InstanceTypeOf(Point):= new Point;
var secondPoint: InstanceTypeOf(Point):= new Point;
Now that there are two objects, their methods can be called. For example, the firstPoint can
be moved to the position 3,3:
firstPoint.setX(3);
firstPoint.setY(3);
The firstPoint occupies now the position 3,3 while the secondPoint still remains at its
original default position 0,0.
3.4.3 Inheritance and subclassing
Classes don't always have to be built from a scratch. A class can inherit behavior from
another class, which is called its superclass. By subclassing the new class automatically
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inherits attributes from the superclass, but it can also add more attributes. It can also
override the inherited attributes, if it so wishes. For example, the class ColorPoint can
inherit attributes from the class Point and add new attributes in the new class. Both classes
will share attributes, but ColorPoint will have more functionality than Point.
The following code declares a class ColorPoint that extends the Point class:
subclass ColorPoint of Point is
var color: Integer := 0;
method setColor(c: Integer) is
self.color := c;
end;
end;
The field color was added to represent the color of the point (encoded as an integer) and
the method setColor for setting the color. Because ColorPoint subclassed the Point class, it
has all the same attributes as Point has. An instance created from the ColorPoint has the
fields x and y as any object of the class Point. Additionally, it also has the field color.
ColorPoint can now be instantiated with an object called darkPoint:
var darkPoint: InstanceTypeOf(ColorPoint):= new ColorPoint;
It is now completely legal to make the following calls:
darkPoint.setX(5);
darkPoint.setY(5);
The darkPoint object behaves just like the previous point objects. It would now be in the
position 5,5.
When subclassing the new class does not necessarily need to inherit any of the attributes of
the superclass. A subclass can, if it so wishes, override all the attributes and inherit nothing
but the type. Therefore, in OO languages one needs to distinguish subclassing from
inheritance. (Abadi & Cardelli 1996, 15.)
3.4.4 Subsumption
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Subsumption, also known as polymorphism, is the ability to use a subclass where an object
of its superclass is expected. As all subclasses of a given class share the same attributes,
i.e. the same type, similar behavior can safely be excepted. The opposite is not possible,
since the superclass does not (necessarily) have the same attributes. If a class Dog defines a
method bark, then all of its subclasses, e.g. GoldenRetriever, can bark and can therefore be
used where an object of a class Dog is expected. A GoldenRetriever is thus subsumed to a
Dog. And so are color points to points; a ColorPoint instance can be used where an
instance of Point is expected.
3.4.5 Taxonomies - Class hierarchies
A class can have infinitely many subclasses, which can in turn be subclassed. This creates
a hierarchy of classes, a taxonomy, starting from the top-most class or classes and
expanding like a tree. Subclasses add attributes on top of all the inherited ones thereby
specializing their behavior. A language can have one class from which all objects must
initially be subclassed (e.g. in Java the Object class) resulting in a taxonomy where there is
only one tree. Some languages (e.g. C++) allow several uppermost classes to be specified
by the programmer resulting in many trees, a forest. Graphically, class hierarchies can look
as in the figure below:
Subclassing creates a hierarchy of objects and classes. The top-most class is the most
abstract, that is, it has the least number of features, whereas the bottom-most classes - the
leaves - are most inclusive; they have inherited all the features on the way down. So, a
Mocha class has whatever attributes are in Drink, plus the attributes in Coffee and finally
the attributes that are unique to Mocha objects.
Coffee
Mocha Latte
Drink
Tea
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3.5 Object-based and class-based languages
The review has so far concentrated on class-based languages. Before any objects can be
created, it is mandatory to first create a class description. Once a class exists, objects can
be created from it. In object-based languages (Abadi & Cardelli 1996, 35-50; Taivalsaari
1997), also called prototype-based languages, a different route is taken: in these languages
objects are created directly - the notion of classes is dropped. Instances are immediately
fully operable, concrete objects. This makes the language much simpler and it also adds
many nice features. The two points can now be created again using the object-based
notation:
object firstPoint is
var x: Integer := 0;
var y: Integer := 0;
method getX(): Integer is
return self.x;
end;
method getY(): Integer is
return self.y;
end;
method setX(x: Integer) is
self.x := x;
end;
method setY(y: Integer) is
self.y := y;
end;
end;
The secondPoint object could be created exactly the same way, but this would be
repetitious. In class-based languages objects are generated from the class with the new
operation. The object-based languages have a different mechanism for instantiating
objects. First of all, it is called cloning. New objects are created by making copies of
objects that already exist - this is similar to what happens in real nature, hence the name:
var secondPoint := clone firstPoint;
This will create a new point named secondPoint. It shares the same attributes as the
firstPoint, but with an independent state. Any amount of objects can be cloned from the
firstPoint. SecondPoint is now also a fully blown object ready to do its work; there is no
need for the new operation. Method calls for secondPoint don't effect the firstPoint and
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vice versa - both objects have their own states. There are now two objects in the 'universe',
but no classes. In the class-based version the universe consisted of two objects plus the
additional platonic class. From an ontological point of view, the object universe is much
simpler.
Cloning itself is not useful unless there is some way to mutate the new objects, that is, to
modify their behavior as was done with subclasses. The prototype-based languages offer
more choices for inheritance than the class-based languages. There are two ways to achieve
inheritance: delegation and embedding. Delegation is a mechanism that delegates behavior
to other objects, whereas embedding is a mechanism that copies behavior from other
objects to the new object. The following creates the colorPoint object in two ways to
illustrate the difference. First by delegation:
object colorPoint child of firstPoint is
var color: Integer := 0;
method setColor(c: Integer) is
self.color := c;
end;
end;
Then by embedding:
object colorPoint child extends firstPoint is
var color: Integer := 0;
method setColor(c: Integer) is
self.color := c;
end;
end;
The result is similar whichever mechanism is used: the universe now contains three
objects5. Two points and one color point. The color point behaves as the two points, that is,
it has the same attributes as the points. By subsumption it can be used anywhere the
firstPoint can be used. The result looks the same as in the class-based version. But there is
a subtle but an important difference. When the inheritance is done with delegation, the
situation is analogous to the class-based version. Since the subclasses, or child objects,
inherit their behavior from the superclass or parent object a change in that code will effect
all the subclasses or child objects. If the getX method is modified, it changes the behavior
of the colorPoint subclass as well and similarly for the colorPoint child object. So, the
delegation inheritance mechanism is similar to the class-based one, but the embedding
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mechanism behaves differently. When an object embeds the behavior of a parent, it is
physically embedded in the object. The result is that changes in the donor object have no
effect at all on its children. This possibility is not available for class-based languages.
The prototype languages have still more to offer. In fact, it is not mandatory to inherit all
the features of the parent object. An object can selectively inherit useful features from its
parent. Still more, objects can even delegate behavior selectively to other objects. For
example, the following point delegates its x coordinate to the firstPoint and the y
coordinate to the secondPoint:
object copycat is
method getX() is
return delegate firstPoint.getX();
end;
method getY() is
return delegate secondPoint.getY();
end;
end;
Embedding could have been used also, but this would not have created an object that
'copies' the two coordinates. The embedded object would have had the same values as the
two points only at the time of the creation. Delegation allows us to create an object that can
copy behavior from wherever it sees fit.
The final point of object-based languages is that when using delegation the parent can be
defined as an attribute as any other. As a result, it can be dynamically changed. Evidently,
this creates an extremely dynamic environment where objects can undergo dramatic
changes in their attributes. Here is the code to change the parent of the copycat object to
colorPoint:
reparent copycat to colorPoint;
The copycat would now be a copy of the colorPoint. It wouldn't know anything anymore
about the firstPoint or the secondPoint.
In summary, the object-based approach concentrates on direct manipulation of concrete
objects. The notion of classes is dropped as being redundant - same results can be achieved
with cloning and inheritance. Object-based languages have two different inheritance
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mechanisms available to them, embedding and delegation. The delegation mechanism also
offers the possibility to create objects from assembling attributes selectively from other
objects. And finally, the most dynamic feature is the possibility for on-the-fly reparenting -
a feature not available in class-based languages nor in frames.
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4. OBJECT-ORIENTED IMPLEMENTATIONS
4.1 The classical theory
The class-based languages have a close affinity to the classical theory of concepts. A
concept has a set of necessary and sufficient attributes that defines it. This is exactly what a
class does - it defines the attributes of all objects created from it. If dogs are defined as
objects that have a name, fur, legs, bark and wag a tail, then the following class can be
build to represent the concept DOG:
subclass Dog of Animal is
var name: String := null;
var fur: InstanceTypeOf(Fur) := new Fur;
var legs: Integer := 4;
method wagTail() is
// ...
end;
method bark() is
// ...
end;
end;
All objects created from the class Dog share these same defining features as required by
the classical theory. They also posses their individual differences: some dogs can be very
heavy, some have unique styles of barking, some are faster, etc. The fact that attributes
have values allows for little individual differences. Note that the class extended the Animal
class. Due to this, all dogs are animals. ANIMAL is a superordinate category of dogs;
whatever defines animals, defines dogs as well. If animals have weight, age, color and
movement, then so do all dogs, because they inherit the attributes. In OO terms this means
that by subsumption a dog is an animal - Dog instances have all the behavior that Animal
instances do.
Furthermore, Taivalsaari (1997) notes that class-based languages correspond precisely to
the ancient view of categories held by Plato and Aristotle, according to whom the essence
of a category is defined by the defining properties and distinguishing properties as follows
(Taivalsaari 1997, 2):
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essence = genus + differentia
That is, a category (essence) is defined by its parent category (genus) and distinguishing
properties (differentia). This is the classical theory: cats and dogs are both animals, which
is their genus, but both must have some defining features that individuate them. "This
corresponds precisely to the idea behind traditional class-based object-oriented
programming in which a class is defined in terms of its superclass (genus) and a set of
additional variables and methods (differentia)" (Taivalsaari 1997, 2).
Then how about the object-based languages? The difference of class-based and object-
based languages was that the latter dropped the notion of classes; there are only concrete
objects. But the whole idea of concepts is to store information pertinent to all members that
fall under the concept. Once there are categories, knowledge can be added, deleted and
modified in them and this knowledge then applies to all objects that belong to the category.
If there are only objects, then we need to update each and every one of them, after learning
something new about the category.
Given this fundament cognitive utility of concepts, it clearly follows that the prototype-
based languages lack something. Namely the fact that there is no language construct at all
that refers to categories, a set of objects. There are no classes, only individual objects. How
can we refer to categories? A language without categories would be like a language where
you would have the words "Plato", "Aristotle" and "Nietzsche", but not the word
"philosopher".
This lack has been noticed in the prototype-based languages, and, consequently, concepts
like family, traits and prototypes have been introduced to refer to groups of objects (Abadi
& Cardelli 1996, 47; Taivalsaari 1997). A prototype, in this case, means a prototypical
object that is not a usual object. There are now two types of objects: normal objects and
prototypes. Prototypes are special objects that cannot be used where normal objects can;
they are meant to be only blueprints from which normal objects are cloned. Thus, a special
object, named a prototype, takes the role of classes. But the classical theory says nothing of
this kind. Categories are not identified by one example of the category. Instead, a category
is an abstract description of the items that fall under it.
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Traits, on the other hand, are abstract descriptions of objects. They are safe from the above
criticism and are good descriptions of categories like classes. But, how in the end are they
different from classes? From a purely psychological perspective, speaking about classes or
traits makes no difference - they both represent classical categories and do it equally well.
The problems encountered by the classical theory are immediately at hand for the class-
based languages and also for frames. Definitions are never perfect. Classes encode defining
attributes, therefore they are inherited by their subclasses. The problem is that there are
always some unusual members that don't fit the tight definition. Chairs, by definition, have
legs, but what to do with a beanbag chair without legs or an office chair with wheels? If
they are instantiated from a subclass of Chair, then they must have legs - no excuses, no
exceptions. (Partridge 1996, 71.)
One way around this problem is to add possibilities for canceling inheritance of some
attributes, but this way we must abandon subsumption also. Another way is to have means
for representing what is typically found in members. The problem, according to Partridge
(1996, 71-72), is that there are no really good ways for deciding when canceling is allowed
or how to measure typicality.
A better interpretation of the relationship in question [inheritance] is that "birds
typically have wings," or "birds usually have wings." But, then, what is the
precise meaning of typically or of usually, […]?
There is none. And once absolute definitional status is abandoned, we are
catapulted into a limbo world of hazy meaning and multiple interpretations.
(Partridge 1996, 72).
4.2 The prototype theory
The class-based paradigm does a good job in modeling the classical theory. It is probably
because of this that it fails miserably in modeling the prototype theory. All instances of a
class share the same attributes and belong equally well to the class. How could there be
typicality effects? The classical theory cannot explain unusual members as has been seen.
In addition to this, there simply just cannot be family resemblances when all objects share
exactly the same attributes.
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In order to achieve prototype effects, some kind of a mechanism must added to the
language. The simplest possible option is to force the classes to include a query mechanism
that returns the typicality of an instance, say, in the range of [0,1]. So, if every object has a
method called something like getTypicality() we can query their goodness and, for
example, sort the objects using their typicality values.
Another, albeit a much more complicated way, to achieve the same is to encode
diagnosticity and salience values of each attribute as suggested by Smith & al. (1988). In
their model, each attribute is given a diagnosticity value, which indicates the importance of
that attribute; some attributes are more important than others - their family resemblance
degree is higher - in determining the category of an object as demonstrated by Rosch &
Mervis (1975). The values of attributes have different importances also; e.g. red is a more
salient value for color than brown, because apples rarely are brown (Smith & al. 1988,
489). The figure below illustrates these values (based on Smith & al. 1988, 490):
Apple(A) I1
1 color red 25
green 5
brown
color red 30
green
brown
0.50 shape round 15
square
cylindrical 5
shape round 20
square
cylindrical
0.25 texture smooth 25
rough 5
bumpy
texture smooth 30
rough
bumpy
The apple (A) on the left is the prototypical apple. The one on the right is an instance. To
compare the instance with the prototype, Tversky's contrast rule is used for each attribute
and then the results are added together. So, the similarity of I1 to A is (Smith & al. 1988,
491):
Sim(A, I1) = 1(25-5-5) + 0.50(15-5-5) + 0.25(25-5-5)
= 15 + 2.5 + 3.75
= 21.25
So, once we know the prototypical object and the diagnosticity and salience values we can
count how prototypical an item is. This model assumes quite a bit though. First of all, we
should know the prototype. Second, we should know all the diagnosticity and salience
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values. But where would all these values come from? Well, there is no way to calculate
them in the model. The same applies to the first, much simpler model. We have to assume
that the programmer inserts the typicality values manually or that input devices somehow
give them.
Objects in the model would still have a classical core. The typicality effects were just
added on top. The result is a dual theory; categories are defined by their attributes, but can
still be rated in terms of their goodness. For practical purposes this could be used, just as
an example, in search results on an online furniture store. If customers search for chairs, it
is probably advisable to present them a very typical chair first, instead of an electric chair
or a wheel chair. Or if the search lists all the chairs available in the store, then it might be a
good idea to sort them using their typicality: first in the list would be the most typical,
normal chairs and the more exotic ones in the end.
How about the prototype languages then? Initially, it seems that they, as even the name
suggests, should be more on a par with the prototype theory. The languages operate on
concrete objects out of which one could be a prototype. As was seen above, this actually
was one of the proposals to refer to a group of objects (Abadi & Cardelli 1996, 47); it is an
interesting coincidence that such a similar solutions have been proposed in the context of
programming languages and theories of concepts. But to talk of prototype-based languages
as being psychologically more real (Taivalsaari 1997) just because of this, is based on an
incorrect interpretation dubbed "The Prototype = Representation Interpretation" by Lakoff
(1987a, 137; 1987b, 63). What the prototype theory says is, that there is an open set of
features that are statistically more widespread in the category, not that there is literally one
single object that represents the category. Although, initially the prototype theory was
interpreted as meaning that the mind stores the prototypical example to represent the
category, this is a misinterpretation demolished later by even Rosch herself:
To speak of a prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what
is really referred to are judgements of degree of prototypicality. Only in some
artificial categories is there by definition a literal single prototype [...]. For
natural-language categories, to speak of a single entity that is the prototype is
either a gross misunderstanding of the empirical data or a covert theory of
mental representation. (Rosch 1978, 40).
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But there is a way in which the prototype languages could, in fact, model the prototype
theory better. The fact that they are not tied to defining features allows them to create
family resemblance categories - this is impossible for class-based languages and frames.
And as Rosch showed, once you have family resemblances you have prototypes (Rosch &
Mervis 1975). If we could only modify the languages, so that they would have a construct
of a class/trait that would only function as placeholder for object. In other words, the
class/trait would not dictate any attributes for objects - they would be computed by the
runtime environment as explained below6. All the programmer would need to do is assign
objects to certain categories. This way "knowledge about a correlation between properties
is computed from an exemplar-based representation when needed, rather than prestored in
the representation" (Smith & Medin 1981, 157).
Pinker & Prince's world (2) serves as an example of a family resemblance category:
ABC
ABR
PBC
AQC
DEF
DER
PEF
DQR
We could arrive at a world like this by first creating the ABC object. After that, a new
object will decide to inherit behavior from it by delegating or embedding A and B. But the
it will decide not to inherit the C property, instead it will replace it with the R property.
The third object, PBC, does the same, but now for the A attribute; it replaces it with P. The
last object will replace the B property with Q. Similar mechanism can produce the objects
in the second category starting from DEF. Note that objects could even add more
properties that are on the examples; an object could have the properties ABQCD for
example.
There are now two family resemblance categories, each consisting of four objects and there
isn't a single property held by all the members in either category. The family resemblance
metric is used to compute the prototypes. The first category contains five attributes
altogether with the following weights A=3, B=3, C=3, R=1, P=1 and Q=1. The second
70
category attributes contain the weights D=3, E=3, F=2, R=2, P=1 and Q=1. Each object's
family resemblance degree is the sum of the weights of each attribute:
ABC 3+3+3 9 DEF 3+3+2 8
ABR 3+3+1 7 DER 3+3+2 8
PBC 1+3+3 7 PEF 1+3+2 6
AQC 3+1+3 7 DQR 3+1+2 6
From these values, a prototype for each category can be assigned. For the first one, it is
ABC. For the second one, there are two prototypes, DEF and DER. The model thus allows
us to create family resemblance categories and to compute the prototypes using a
mechanism that is backed up by psychological theories. This is, then, a mathematically
precise account for what is meant by "typically" and can by used to overcome the
inheritance problems encountered above with class-based languages and frames without
being catapulted into Partridge's "limbo world of hazy meaning and multiple
interpretations" (1996, 72).
The model does not do the classification however; it is still left to the programmer to place
objects in categories. In order to compute the cue validities of a category, the members
need to be known already. But once the prototypes are known, the model could possibly be
used for classification also, because if we encounter an unknown lonesome object, we
could count its family resemblance degree in every category and assign it to the one where
it scores highest. For example, PER would score 2 (1+0+1) in the first category and 6
(1+3+2) in the second. Surely, it feels more at home in the second category.
Another interesting thing with this model is that it can simulate Pinker & Prince's changing
worlds. It could well happen that all the objects in the category would share the same
attributes - that is, they would delegate exactly the same behavior. In this case, the
distribution of each attribute would be the same. But we can go even to the other extreme -
to the worlds (3) and (4); all objects would be completely different and hence their family
resemblance degree the same.
The model can handle the continuum from chaotic worlds to family resemblance worlds
and finally back to classical well-defined worlds, but it does have one weakness. If the
objects are left to converge to a classical world, then all the attributes would have a similar
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distribution and hence the same typicality values. But this is not psychologically adequate.
As was seen in the experiments by Armstrong & al. (1983), participants could rate item's
typicality even if the category was a digital, all-or-none, category. In this model, the
typicality effects disappear once the category becomes classical. If this model has been at
all honest to Pinker & Prince's theory, then this conclusion equally well undermines their
version of the dual theory.
The prototype languages, then, provide a way for encoding family resemblance categories
and a precise account of typicality (assuming that the model is technically feasible).
Unfortunately, as appealing as it may first look, the model suffers from the same weakness
as the theory being modeled: it does not explain the compositionality of thought.
Prototypes encode the features typically found in members, but this is why they don't
compose. Our model can encode the features typically found in pets and fish, but these
features are not found in typical pet fish. Any family resemblance model suffers from this
problem. When we need to create a new class from already existing ones, which attributes
will it inherit? The new complex concept will inherit the attributes that just happen to be
widely distributed at that time. What it should inherit is the essence of the concept -
whatever it is...
These models have managed to provide models for the prototype theory with both types of
languages. But probably the biggest weakness in the entire OO paradigm, is that it forces
the design to start from the uppermost, abstract categories - the superordinate level -
although psychological studies have clearly shown that this is not the case; categorization
starts from the middle, the basic level, and later proceeds to the super- and subordinate
levels.
Experts are people who know very high and low levels of categories. The process of
becoming an expert is a matter of years. It takes time and lots of work to find higher and
higher levels of abstractions. However, we all have to start at the intuitive basic level. But
the OO paradigm does not allow this. Instead, it expects us to be natural born experts and
to start immediately from the top level. But most likely we will get hierarchy wrong,
because we can't be excepted to know in advance what it is. The result is that we will have
to revise the class hierarchy several times:
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If the implementation of a class hierarchy is started a priori, i.e., before a
sufficient level of expertise has been reached, substantial iteration in the
implementation of the library is inevitable, since later experience is bound to
reveal generalizations and new abstractions that will necessitate changes in the
superclasses. (Taivalsaari 1997, 8).
4.3 The dual theories
All the models for the prototype theory resulted in implementing the two types of dual
theories. First, we saw two ways to add the identification procedure on top of the classical
core. The second model modified the object-based languages in order to create family
resemblance categories, which are in the middle of a continuum from classical to random
categories, and offered also a procedure to extract the prototypes.
Both models suffer from the criticism directed against dual theories: there are not many
people out there who still have hope of finding definitions and since prototypes encode the
attributes that objects statistically tend to posses, they don't compose. Or they do, but the
results are not semantically proper, like was seen in the pet fish example.
4.4 The neoclassical theory
According to the neoclassical theory, concepts are defined by partial definitions. The
problem is that it was left unclear how to turn the partial definitions into full definitions
without retreating to the classical theory. We have seen that OO approach copes perfectly
well with the classical theory, so from that we can say that it copes equally with the
neoclassical one, because the partial definitions are classical definitions. Since the
neoclassical theory does not reveal what its difference to the classical one is, it is
impossible to examine how the OO implementation might look like.
But just for curiosity we can try to see how Jackendoff rule "the causation of a state that
endures over a period of time" could be programmed:
class Causative is
method cause is (S: State, T: Time) is
return S.endure(T);
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end;
end;
The above loosely defined class is an example of what unites the causatives and also how
they differ: the difference is in the values given to the cause method.
The interesting thing to note is that the example actually proves Fodor's counter arguments.
If the differences in the causative expressions are the semantic markers, the values given to
the cause method, then in all cases CAUSE remains the same. Fodor's argument was
precisely that partial definitions use some concepts univocally and these concepts do not
behave neoclassically. In the example above, CAUSE does not change its meaning and
neither does ENDURE - they always remain the same. We could have built separate
classes for ENDURE and CAUSE, but this would not help, because those classes would
have some attributes that are univocal. Attributes in classes do not change - their values do.
Hence, there are always some concepts that are not neoclassical.
4.5 The theory-theory
The theory-theory takes a different approach to concepts than the feature-based theories.
The latter ones rely on attributes to explain what concepts are, whereas the theory-theory
claims that concepts are embedded in theories. It is the theory that explains why objects
have the attributes that they happen to have.
The problem was that we are not told what a theory is. Is it something else than concepts or
is it just the way concepts are organized? If it is just the way concepts are organized, then
perhaps class or object hierarchies could be a way to model the organization. The problem
is that this would not actually be any different from the models for the classical or the
prototype theory. All we would do is just say that the organization is the theory - there is
no language construct that would represent the theory. It seems odd that the same model
could implement both the classical and the theory-theory. If the theory is something else
than concepts, then it is hard to see what it could be in terms of OO languages; if concepts
are likened to classes and objects, then there is nothing else in the languages that could be
the theory without being a concept. In OO languages, as the name implies, there are only
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objects. So, it seems to me that the only way to model theories in the end is the class or
object hierarchies.
I think the theory-theory is the best place to talk about scripts, because it is the only one of
our theories that can explain why the features come in a certain order. Beneath scripts there
can be a theory that explains why people typically order the food before eating it or why
tickets are paid before seeing a movie. These attributes can easily be added in an object or
a class as is done with other concepts, but neither language has anything to say about the
order of the attributes. There is no way to prevent the method for exiting a restaurant from
being called before the method for entering a restaurant or for making sure that food is not
paid before it is eaten. Hence, OO languages provide no natural way to model scripts,
event concepts.
The theory-theory relies on the principle of psychological essentialism - the observation
that objects can undergo dramatic changes in their appearance, but still be treated as the
same object. Take again the example of a butterfly. First, it starts its life as a caterpillar and
later develops into an adult butterfly. At this stage, it probably has none of the visible
attributes that it had as a caterpillar. An apple starts as a seed and later takes the form of a
fruit. How can we model these kinds of metamorphoses?
The class-based languages have no natural model for this, because once an object is
instantiated from a class it remains fixed throughout its life cycle. This is a problem for
class-based languages, because not only can objects go through metamorphoses, categories
can also be extended on the fly. If a man carrying heavy boxes decides to take a rest and
sits on one of the boxes, that box becomes a chair. Or if a spoon is moved to an art gallery
it becomes a piece of art. This problem has been noted in the context of frames:
Similarly, there are always situations that do not fit any particular frame or
schema very comfortably. If I sit on a log, it becomes, to some extent, a chair
(therefore, a friend might say, "Can I share your chair?"). But this possibility is
unlikely to be in any chair frame. As another example, is a large canopy on the
lawn to be reasoned about using a room schema (rooms do not usually have
grass on the floor, but they do have tables and chairs in and a ceiling
overhead)? (Partridge 1996, 76).
75
With the notion of reparenting, the object-based languages can overcome these situations.
The previous example of a box becoming a chair could be well modeled by changing the
parent of the box object to a chair. In fact, with reparenting we can model any type and any
amount of metamorphoses. An object can undergo drastic changes by reparenting itself,
but it would still be the same object - as is required by psychological essentialism. Note
that objects can still have some attributes that don't change, namely those that are not
inherited. Prototype-based languages clearly win this round. Even if an on-the-fly change
of the superclass would be possible for the class-based languages, this would not help,
because using it will change the superclass of all objects created from that class, which is
not what is wanted in these situations. All that is needed is to change the parent of the one
particular box that ends up being a chair for a while - the other boxes must remain intact.
Creating a new intermediate object from the class Chair does not help either, because then
there would be two objects, one would be the chair and one would be the box. But this
contradicts the principle of psychological essentialism. There is just one object that
becomes a chair for a short while.
4.6 The atomistic theory
Among all the theories of concepts, the atomistic theory is a strange beast. According to it,
concepts have no structure whatsoever. They are simply atoms. How can unstructured
concepts be modeled with the OO approach? The answer is very short: they can't.
If concepts have no structure, then there is nothing to write into a class or an object. All our
classes and objects would be empty. There is nothing in them and out of nothing comes
nothing. Classes surely have different names, but there is nothing that individuates them.
The situation becomes even clearer when inheriting is considered. Say, that there are the
following primitive concepts: BLACK, BROWN, CAT and MUFFIN. The complex
concept BLACK CAT could be subclassed from the classes Black and Cat as is done
below.
subclass BlackCat of Black, Cat is
end;
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How would this class look like? It would not look much like anything, because there is
nothing in it. It would not have inherited any behavior, because there is, again, nothing to
inherit. Even worse, it could have subclassed any classes. So, if BlackCat is created from
Brown and Cat, it would be identical to the previous BlackCat. And, in fact, so would the
BlackCat created from Brown and Muffin. All these classes would be the same. Surely
something has gone badly wrong. A concept composed of BLACK and CAT is not the
same concept as the one composed of BROWN and MUFFIN.
The atomistic theory is a devastating blow to the OO knowledge representation. But so it is
for any knowledge representation tool that relies on structure, because as soon as we add
something into a class or a frame or a script or whatever, there is structure and structure
won't do in this case. The second problem is the sheer amount of primitive concepts. If all
lexical concepts are primitive, then the number is somewhat close to the number of words
in a language. Any model that tries to handle this will most likely run into severe problems
of computational complexity. So, if the theory is correct, then it maybe cannot be handled
computationally at all (Fodor 1975, 155-156; Salo 1999).
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5. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS
This study has reviewed six major theories of concepts. None of them has a final word to
say about what concepts are; each has its own advantages and weaknesses. The study has
also covered the OO knowledge representation and the difference between the traditional
class-based languages and the new prototype languages. Finally, I suggested OO
implementations for each theory of concepts with class-based and object-based languages
and evaluated their naturalness as a knowledge representation tool. The following is a short
review.
The classical theory. The traditional class-based languages provide a surprisingly plausible
model for the classical theory. The same can be achieved with the object-based languages
with the introduction of traits. But the models also run into all the problems encountered
for the classical theory of concepts. There are always exceptions to definitions and unclear
cases that don't fit into classes or traits.
The prototype theory. The class-based languages are far from being suitable models for the
prototype theory. They lack typicality effects and family resemblance structures. The
typicality effects could be achieved with some modifications to the language as was
shown, but there is no way to model family resemblance categories if all members have
exactly the same properties. Initially, it might seem that prototype languages resemble the
prototype theory; they operate on concrete objects out of which one could be the prototype.
But this conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of the theory. However, there is a way
the prototype languages can model family resemblance categories (provided that traits
work only as placeholders for objects) and from this prototype effects rise naturally. The
proposed model created true family resemblance categories and showed how to compute
the prototypes. It also worked as an example of how to define precisely what is typicality -
a problem noted for frames when inheritance is used and unusual cases are encountered.
The dual theories. The two implementations for the prototype theory ended up actually
being dual theories of concepts. The first version was the core and the identification
procedure version and the second implemented Pinker & Prince's continuum version,
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although in the second model prototype effects disappear once the objects converge back
to a classical world. This, in my opinion, is not a problem of the model. Instead, it
undermines Pinker & Prince's version of the dual theory. Being dual theories both of these
models suffer from double psychological criticism: the criticism directed against the
classical and the prototype theories of concepts.
The neoclassical theory. No implementation was found for the neoclassical theory. The
partial definitions - being the same as classical definitions - are easy to model, but a final
evaluation is impossible to give until the theory tells us how partial definitions are
converted into full definitions. The proposed very loosely defined example did, however,
support Fodor's counter arguments against the entire theory.
The theory-theory. There is no appealing way to model the theory-theory. This is due to the
fact that until a precise account of what the theory-theory means by "theory", it is hard to
say how well the OO paradigm could model it. The only proposed solution was to liken
theories to class hierarchies, but I doubt that this satisfies the theory-theorists. Scripts,
event concepts were discussed in the context of the theory-theory, but we saw that the OO
languages provide no natural means for modeling scripts - the order of events. Methods
can be called in any order - including the wrong one. The principle of psychological
essentialism - the fact that objects can undergo metamorphosis and still retain their identity
- was also discussed within the theory-theory. Object can also be viewed differently in
different contexts: a box can become a chair, if someone decides to sit on it. The class-
based languages and the frame-based knowledge representation have a hard time with this.
Instead, this study showed that the object-based languages have a way out of this problem.
With the notion of reparenting objects can change their attributes any way they want and
still keep their identity - their psychological essence. The object-based languages are thus
capable of overcoming this problem.
The atomistic theory. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no way to model atomistic
concepts with the OO paradigm, because they are unstructured. Moreover, it is impossible
to do it with any knowledge representation tool that relies on structure. If the atomistic
theory turns out to be correct, then perhaps it cannot be modeled computationally at all.
But this doesn't mean that knowledge representation engineers should throw in the towel.
The only thing that the atomistic theory says is that the structure cannot be a constitutive
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part of concepts. This in no way denies that descriptions don't exist at all; there surely is
plenty of information plugged into concepts - it just plays no role in concept's identity.
The main problem is that cognitive science does not know what concepts are. We are left
with just bits of scattered findings: there are typicality effects, some concepts might be
classical, some form family resemblances, concepts are compositional, the basic level is
cognitively more important, people are essentialists in their thinking and have knowledge
about why some features are important and how they are ordered.
The following table summarizes the main findings of this study:
Class-based Object-based
Definitions Yes. Yes, with traits.
Compositionality Yes. Yes, with traits. The
family resemblance
model suffers from the
pet fish -problem.
Psychological
essentialism
No. Once an object is
created it remains
immutable.
Yes. Reparenting allows
dramatic changes in
objects.
Family resemblance No. All objects have the
same attributes.
Yes. Objects can
selectively inherit
features.
Prototype effects No, but can be added. Yes. Family resemblance
structure generates
prototypes.
Basic level No. No.
Scripts No. No.
This study set out to show that the object-based languages offer many advantages for
modeling concepts and that the entire OO paradigm suffers from two weaknesses. This can
be seen from the table. The object-based languages are better suited for more cases than the
class-based languages. They can do all that the class-based languages can, but they can
also simulate family resemblance categories and allow objects to undergo changes in their
attributes, but still retain their essence; the class-based languages and frames cannot do
this. The table also shows the two weaknesses in both languages: the lack of basic level
and script concepts.
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In sum, it can be said that the OO paradigm models well concepts. The idea of
incorporating functions and data into objects is surely what concepts do also. Moreover,
the class-based model is very close to the classical theory of concepts and the prototype
languages to family resemblance concepts. The problem is that both of these theories have
been more or less abandoned in cognitive science or at least serious modifications are
needed for them; so one should keep this in mind before boasting that the OO approach is
psychologically plausible or intuitive.
Before the final theory of concepts arrives, future research could investigate how to modify
the languages to support what is already known about concepts. First, as was said, neither
type of OO language supports the primacy of the basic level of concepts. Programming in
OO languages is incremental and therefore it starts from the root of the hierarchy. But
categorization starts from the middle. This point has also practical implications. Lots of
money and time is wasted if class hierarchies have to be revised time after time. The idea
of getting it correct at the first shot is justifiable in the case where programmers already
know everything about the universe to be modeled, but this is rarely the case. In real life,
programmers work under overly optimistic timetables, vague requirements and constant
pressure for new features in the products (Brooks 1987; Taivalsaari 1997). If this is the
case, then the modeling tool should permit the engineers to start intuitively from the basic
level and let them find the super- and subordinate levels in due course.
Second, the idea of incorporating data and functions prevented the programmers from
passing data to wrong functions. Since methods in the OO style are part of the objects,
these types of mistakes cannot happen any more; the language secures that. But it does not
prevent the methods from being called in the wrong order. When discussing scripts, we
saw that people have sequential knowledge attached to concepts. The concept
BIRTHDAY-PARTY contains information about the typical order of the attributes. This
type of information is not available in objects. Adding this feature would make the
languages more secure, because once a class is correctly designed, it could prevent the
class users from accidentally calling the methods in a wrong order. This can have crucial
importance in some situations: changing traffic lights or performing airplane checkup
functions in the wrong order for example. I am not sure how these things could be added to
the languages, or even if they can be, but the point is that there remains some beneficial
features that would improve the intuitiveness of the OO style.
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6. NOTES
1. The examples are taken from Lakoff (1987a/1987b). Both books provide many other similar examples.
2. I assume that the reader is familiar with the basic architectures of ANNs and training algorithms. For an
introduction see Beale & Jackson (1990). Clark (1993/1996) explains the philosophical issues and how
concepts are represented in ANNs.
3. Pinker & Prince obtain the number O.67. Someone is wrong and I am not sure whom, but it doesn't
really matter. It is still useful enough to classify the objects, because the probability is much higher than
0.375.
4. I suppose this criticism can possibly be directed against any knowledge representation system; once
things get bigger, they get more complicated and in the end nobody understands them...
5. An ontological point is in order. Out of the two inheritance mechanisms only the embedding is
ontologically plausible. If real objects could inherit behavior by delegation, then one can imagine a
science fiction world where an object could delegate, for example, its vision or digestion system to other
objects. An object could also change its parents on the fly. Surely this is impossible - one cannot
rechoose her parents or use someone else's vision system. Real objects inherit properties at the moment
they are born, that is, by embedding. (Lecture notes, Petri Mäenpää, 1999.)
6. The language could, for example, have a construct category for assigning objects in them. As an
example,
object pluto, category Dog, is ...
could create an object named pluto and assign it in the Dog category. It is up to the runtime environment
to keep track of all the categories and the objects in them. Each time a new object is classified into a
category the family resemblance degrees of the objects found in the category need to be computed again.
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